Anti-Extradition Bill Movement
Public Sentiment Report

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(Revised Edition)
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Chapter 1: Background

Context of this Report

1.1 On February 13, 2019 the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government made its move to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance Cap. 503 (hereafter called “the Extradition Bill”) and, in so doing, stirred up a major social, political controversy. On June 9, 2019 the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) organized an anti-extradition bill march in which, it was claimed, over one million people participated. On June 12, a protest consisting predominantly of students and youths surrounded the Legislative Complex to prevent the HKSAR government from resuming the 2nd reading of the Extradition Bill. Police cleared the area using tear gas, bean bag bullets and rubber bullets. They injured numerous people and were severely criticized by the community and the media for their excessive use of force and abuse of power.

1.2 On June 15, Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced the temporary suspension of work on the Extradition Bill, but members of the public were not satisfied with this expedient response. The following day, on June 16, a reported two million people took to the streets with five key demands and wanted these be addressed. The demands included: (1) the complete withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, (2) the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the use of firearms by the police, (3) an amnesty for all arrestees, (4) the retraction of the police label that the June 12 rally was a riot, and (5) the resignation of Carrie Lam. Aside from taking part in the rallies organized by the CHRF, members of the public also placed newspaper advertisements, marched to embassies and consulates, and surrounded police headquarters to express their dissatisfaction and anger towards the government. Then on July 1, 2019, allegedly some 550,000 people took to the streets again, and in so doing shattered the attendance records of all previous July 1 marches. Finally, on September 4, Chief Executive Carrie Lam officially announced the full withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, but she refused to accede to the other four key demands, and social unrest continued.

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1 The full name of the Extradition Bill is Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019. The Extradition Bill actually consists of amendments to two ordinances, with the first ordinance, Fugitive Offenders Ordinance Cap. 503, being at the center of controversy. This ordinance was in focus due to the significant change proposed, that for the first time in 90 years, people living in Hong Kong can be removed from Hong Kong to stand trial in the Mainland or serve a criminal sentence there.

2 The number of people joining various protests and demonstrations are usually announced by the different parties, including the police and the event organizers, with neither empirical evidence nor verification by independent researchers. The numbers quoted in this report follow mainly from reports of the mainstream media.
1.3 For another six months thereafter, Hong Kong people continued to use a variety of ways like marching and rallying to press the government for the acceptance of their demands. The spill-over of such demonstrations into various districts and locations in Hong Kong without any clear leadership led us to view this as a spontaneous and popular anti-extradition bill movement. During the course of its development, the movement was marked by major watershed events such as the “White-clad People Incident” in Yuen Long on July 21, the “Prince Edward MTR Station Incident” on August 31, the first firing of a live round at a protester on October 1 and the implementation of the anti-mask law on October 4. These incidents raised the stakes of the entire anti-extradition bill debacle and aggravated the relationship between the police and the people.

**Organization of this Study**

**Crowd-funding Stage**

1.4 To try to understand the controversy surrounding the introduction of the Extradition Bill, the tumultuous events that followed, and the changes in public sentiment, Project Citizens Foundation (PCF) took the initiative to commission an objective, comprehensive and Hong Kong-based study of the controversy with a view of producing a public sentiment report of the movement after the study. In July 2019, the Hong Kong Public Opinion Program (HKPOP) under the auspices of the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (HKPORI) started the process by conducting the first of three phases of studies which ultimately led to the compilation of this report, the *Anti-Extradition Bill Movement - Public Sentiment Report*.

1.5 PCF used the crowd-funding platform Collaction\(^3\) to raise funds for this study and set a goal of HK$1 million. The goal was reached on July 11 within 30 hours. The project received funding from nearly 4,300 supporters, with each person contributing on average of HK$250.

1.6 The study contributing to this “Anti-Extradition Bill Movement – Public Sentiment Report” ("this Report") comprises the following three phases:

**First Phase**

In the first phase of the study, HKPOP conducted a HongKong-wide public opinion survey by means of random telephone sampling and interviewed 1,007 people aged 14 or above from July 24 to 26. HKPOP published the results on August 2. Questions in the survey measured people’s support for the Extradition Bill, their assessment of the factors contributing to the governance crisis, their level of satisfaction towards the Hong Kong

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\(^3\) [https://www.collaction.hk/project/story/854/](https://www.collaction.hk/project/story/854/)
Police Force, their tolerance of the protesters, and their views on how the government should respond to the protesters’ demands, as well as their views on the mentality of the youths.

Second Phase

The second phase of the study consists of some follow-up studies to try to gauge the opinions of the youths, the reasons behind their participation in the protests, and their ideas and demands regarding the anti-extradition bill movement. This phase includes two focus groups and one youth deliberative engagement meeting. The results were announced by HKPOP on September 12.

The two focus groups were conducted on August 14 and 15, 2019, with twenty young people aged between 19 to 30. The research team recruited participants using random telephone sampling, followed up by social media contacts using the application WhatsApp.

The deliberative meeting was held on August 24 from 9:30 am to 3:30 pm. A total of 98 participants attended, between the ages of 18 and 30. A total of 94 participants attended the entire meeting and completed the pre- and post-deliberation questionnaires. All participants were recruited through a random telephone survey, followed up by WhatsApp, SMSs and/or emails. Briefing materials were provided to participants prior to the deliberative meeting. The meeting consisted of plenary and small group sessions. Before and after the deliberation sessions, the participants filled out a questionnaire so that the research team could measure their opinion change across various items of interest. The participants spent the day deliberating on different topics, such as the Extradition Bill, the government’s position, the options offered by the protesters, as well as the roles of different sectors and political parties, and the options available for resolving the stalemate.

Third Phase

Having conducted a public opinion survey in Stage 1 and follow-up studies in Stage 2, HKPOP compiled this report based on the data and information collected in those studies and also through other channels. This report documents public opinion collected via four different channels: marches/processions, public opinion polling, traditional media and new media, in order to present a holistic picture of public sentiment from a civil society perspective.

The study period covers events from February 13, 2019 when the HKSAR government first proposed to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance up to October 22, 2019 shortly after Chief Executive Carrie Lam delivered her 2019 Policy Address. The period spanned over 36 calendar weeks covering most of the important events associated with the anti-extradition bill movement. The first edition of this report was officially released on December 13, 2019 while the revised edition was completed on March 31, 2020 when the movement was completely overtaken by the coronavirus pandemic.
Report Content and Limitations

1.7 This report consists of eight chapters. Other than this opening chapter, Chapter 2 describes an overview of the research design covering the specific methods used in different chapters and their limitations. Chapter 3 compiles opinion surveys relevant to the Extradition Bill controversy and describes the trends of change in public sentiment. Chapter 4 examines processions and rallies and studies the mobilization of the anti-extradition bill and pro-extradition bill camps. Chapter 5 explores campaigning via traditional media such as crowd-funding, printed newspaper advertisements and related materials. Chapter 6 explores campaigning via the new media, focusing on the usage, strengths, and limitations of the LIHKG forum, Twitter and Telegram. Chapter 7 provides a focused analysis on youth opinion which is taken to be an important driving force of the movement. Chapter 8 concludes the study with some deep reflections and further questions.

1.8 Almost all materials in this report are gathered by HKPOP. In light of time and resource constraints, and the fact that the movement has not yet ended during the main study period, Project Citizens Foundation welcomes the voluntary provision of any supplementary materials by any individual or organizations after the publication of this report if such collective efforts would enhance the validity and accuracy of this study.

1.9 The design and conduct of this research were carried out independently by HKPOP after consulting PCF. HKPOP conducted the study, collected the data, and analysed the data independently without the influence of any particular individual or organization. In other words, HKPOP was given full autonomy to design and conduct this research, and everything contained in this report is the sole responsibility of HKPOP under the auspices of HKPORI.
Chapter 2: Research Design

2.1 This report is based on a study of information collected from a wide array of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include focus group discussions, deliberative meetings, and social media software-derived data. Secondary sources include news articles, public opinion surveys, and supplementary online materials. We now explain chapter by chapter the type of data we used in each chapter, how we collected and analyzed them, and also the limitations associated with such analyses.

2.2 Chapter 3 is a collection of opinion surveys, and the method we used is somewhat like a “survey of surveys”. We used a variety of channels including WiseNews search to locate and compile opinion polling data over the study period. Due to time and resource constraints, we only included publicly reported opinion polls and surveys within the examined period. They included surveys conducted by universities, political parties and organizations, think tanks, media outlets, and members of civil society. In terms of analysis, we drew upon publicly accessible press releases and reports from different organizations. If such documents were unobtainable, content from news reports were used as reference. Indeed, due to time and resource constraints, we could only conduct some basic analyses of all the polls.

2.3 In Chapter 4, we used a variety of channels to search for content on relevant rallies, gatherings and protests. We also conducted WiseNews keyword search to find the information. Because of resource constraint, we could only record reported marches, gatherings and protests. Because many of the events were self-initiated, across many districts and organized by people and netizens sometimes on the same day, we could only estimate attendance based on observations of reporters or from photographs. We therefore cannot be completely accurate about the attendance figures of different rallies and processions. It is important to note that the attendance figures for most of the marches, gatherings and processions did not have the benefit of corroboration by a neutral academic institution. Given the lack of a scientific methodology and uncertainty of political motivations, the figures announced by the organizers or reported by the media can only be taken as crude references to give some indication of the scales of the events. Furthermore, because many flash protests in the forms of gatherings, mass singing, and human chains were similar in nature, we could only rely on news reports to group these activities under one category. As there were also many smaller-scale activities taking place alongside the major protests, we may have underestimated the number and extent of such activities.

2.4 Chapter 5 uses content analysis to study how different camps use traditional media to mobilise support. We made use of the findings from Stages 1 and 2 of this study to conduct different online searches, including WiseNews keyword searches, to locate all relevant stories reported by the tradition media. Due to resource constraints, we could only conduct some rough collations and analyses to show how traditional media
mobilized protesters and aroused the attention of the international community to the movement.

2.5 **Chapter 6** uses content analysis to study how the opposition camp uses new media to mobilise support. We again made use of the findings from Stages 1 and 2 of this study to kick start our content analysis. In order to study how the opposition camp used the uptake of Twitter as an instrument to raise the concern of overseas audiences, we conducted a preliminary Twitter analysis using software from Crimson Hexagon, a social media analytics company, using access provided by the School of Journalism of The University of British Columbia. We then supplemented the analysis from Crimson Hexagon with more online searches, including WiseNews searches, along with anecdotal observations on Telegram and the LIHKG Forum. Due to time and resource constraints, we can only conduct a rough analysis of how new media may have mobilised people to raise the concern of overseas audiences on the anti-extradition bill movement.

2.6 **Chapter 7** is a study of youth opinion primarily based on the result of Stages 1 and 2 studies. As explained in Chapter 1 of this report, we first conducted a representative survey in July 24 to 26 covering 1,007 Hong Kong residents over the aged 14 or above, amongst whom 251 were aged below 30. To garner a deeper understanding of the youth’s sentiment, two focus groups and one deliberative meeting were held in Stage 2, engaging 20 and 98 youths respectively. This chapter highlights our findings on youth opinions through these qualitative and quantitative studies.

2.7 **Chapter 8** being our conclusion is technically not a research narration, so we may not need to explain the methodology. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to explain at this juncture that there could be a variety of ways to conclude this study – by describing the public sentiment and its course of development over the period of study, by describing the roles played by different stakeholders in shaping public opinion, by addressing some popular questions about the causes and effects of the movement, or by digging deep into the level of core values and divergent beliefs which have generated the movement, and possibly many more perspectives. The research team, however, has chosen to conclude the study by posting more questions than answers at different levels of analysis, not just because many facts are hitherto hidden but because this may help Hong Kong, China and the international community to reflect better and more on what this lesson can bring to anyone and everyone who cares about Hong Kong and the world.

2.8 Further, a chronology of important events in the movement is set out in the **Annex** to provide readers with a timeline and context to interpret the public sentiments in the following chapters.
Chapter 3: Opinion Surveys

Description and Configuration

3.1 Based on our searched results, we found 33 opinion polls or surveys related to the Extradition Bill within the time frame (that is, from February 13 to October 22, 2019)\(^4\). Groups and organizations initiating the polls included universities and academics, political parties, think tanks, media outlets, and members of society. Due to their different standards in polling, the sample sizes ranged from 442 to 138,000 people. The polling methods included telephone interviews, internet polls, and questionnaires. Due to different needs of different surveys, their target populations were also different, but the majority of them targeted Cantonese speaking adults. Some surveys also expanded the youth age cohort to include 14 to 15 years old.

3.2 We made reference to the August 2014 Guideline for Public Opinion Research issued by the World Association for Public Opinion Research to establish the major criteria for the inclusion of opinion polls or surveys in our description and analysis. Backgrounds of groups and organizations was not considered a relevant factor. After applying the criteria, 13 polls remained. Table 3.1 summarizes the total count by groups or organizations, and Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of polls by month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiating groups/organizations</th>
<th>University opinion researchers/academics</th>
<th>Political parties/Political groups</th>
<th>Thinktanks</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Members of society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) See HKPORI-PCF PSR Online Reference at [https://www.pori.hk](https://www.pori.hk) for poll description, sample and executive summary.
3.3 We can distinguish three phases of opinion polling. The first phase is between February 13 and June 8, which includes the government consultation work on the Extradition Bill until the eve of the June 9 march organized by the CHRF. The second phase is between June 9, effectively inaugurating the anti-extradition bill movement, and September 4, when Carrie Lam announced the official withdrawal of the Extradition Bill. The third phase is between September 5 and October 22.

3.4 Aside from HKPORI polls, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) conducted most number of polls, showing the shift in public opinion from major events to antagonism of the Hong Kong Police Force.

3.5 The first phase comprises three polls which fulfil the criteria. Survey questions center on whether people support the Extradition Bill amendment, and the amendment to the system for subjecting fugitives in Hong Kong.

3.6 Hong Kong Research Association released a poll in mid-April showing that 45% of respondents supported and 35% opposing the Extradition Bill amendment. On June 6, the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at CUHK and Public Opinion Programme at The Hong Kong University (HKUPOP) released findings showing that 48% and 66% of Hong Kong people opposed extraditing Hong Kong residents to the Mainland for trial while support rate stood at 24% and 17%. A rough guess from the polls is that opposition to the Extradition Bill amendment gradually increased from April to June.

3.7 The second phase comprises five surveys which fulfill the criteria. They focus on whether the government should respond to the five demands, including (1) the
full withdrawal of the Extradition Bill amendment, (2) setting up an independent commission of inquiry, (3) retracting the official characterisation of the protests as “riots”, (4) the release of all arrested protesters, and (5) restarting political reforms. The surveys also cover people’s satisfaction with the Hong Kong Police Force, its performance in handling the situation and whether they have used force appropriately. There are also opinion surveys conducted at the sites of the protests.

3.8 Out of the five demands, the polls found that other than demanding the government to formally withdraw the Extradition Bill amendment, people also asked it to establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the incidents in the past many months.

3.9 The CUHK and PORI polls also find that people were concerned with the way the police handled the protests. The CUHK poll finds that as many as 68% of respondents considered the police having used excessive force, while the PORI one finds that 58% of respondents thought the police has used excessive force. In the PORI poll on August 8, over 61% of respondents were dissatisfied with the overall performance of the police in handling the situation.

3.10 However, the CUHK and PORI polls also find that 39% and 44% of the respondents also thought the protesters used excessive force.

3.11 Onsite survey findings from CUHK released on August 12 find that participants of protests in July and August consisted mainly of 20 to 30 years old, with 68% to 80% of protest participants holding higher education degrees. The surveys also found that middle and lower classes who participated in the protests were fifty-fifty in proportion.

3.12 The third phase contained five polls which fulfilled the selection criteria. Poll questions included respondents’ opinions towards the government’s withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, the other four key demands, the implementation of the anti-mask law, and their concerns about the police. When respondents were asked for their views on Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s four areas of action in response to the five major demands, the CUHK poll find that respondents were generally dissatisfied. They generally thought that an independent commission of inquiry was needed, followed by the demand to reinitiate electoral reform for universal suffrage.

3.13 The CUHK polls find that respondents’ views of escalating violent tactics on both the police and protesters has been rather stable. Grouping various CUHK polls conducted from August to October together, between 69% and 71% of the respondents agreed that the police has used excessive force, and between 39% and 41% of the respondents considered protesters have used excessive force. In the poll conducted by CUHK’s Hong Kong Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies, almost 60% of the respondents agreed that while pursuing the major demands, protests must remain peaceful, reasonable and
non-violent. Roughly one third of the respondents respectively supported, opposed or remained neutral to the use of radical means to pursue the major demands, showing a mixed sentiment in using radical approaches.

3.14 People are also concerned with issues related to the police. The PORI poll on October 22 find that over 60% of the respondents thought that the police colluded with the triads in the July 21 incident, and thought that the People’s Armed Police had members mixed into the Hong Kong Police Force.

3.15 The Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at CUHK and PORI further conducted polls on peoples’ views on the anti-mask law, and find that people generally opposed the anti-mask law. The CUHK poll finds that around 71% of respondents opposed the anti-mask law. The younger and more educated the respondents, the more they agreed that protesters had the right to wear masks in protests. Polling by PORI’s Public Opinion Panel shows similar levels of opposition with the CHUK poll, as 68% of the respondents opposed the anti-mask law.

Figure 3.2. Satisfaction rating of the Hong Kong Police Force from June 2012 to August 2019; Note that the last data point was collected from a survey outside the tracking series (Source: Public Opinion Programme at The University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute)
Figure 3.3. Support of Chief Executive Carrie Lam from July 2017 to October 2019 spaced out on 3-month intervals, data elected from a bi-weekly tracking survey series (Source: Public Opinion Programme at The University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute)

Figure 3.4. Public Sentiment Index from July 1992 to October 2019 (Source: Public Opinion Programme at The University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute)
Concept and Introduction

3.16 Public opinion polling originated in western society in the nineteenth century. Early applications of public opinion polling includes the study of voting preferences and market promotions. Since 1824, media in the United States have used straw polls to understand voter intentions before the presidential elections. With the popularization of printed media and radio, corporations have used newspapers to understand product preferences of the public. Up until the early twentieth century, the use of public opinion in forming government policies became gradually more important, and governments began to put a heavier emphasis on public opinion polling.

3.17 It is not hard to imagine that democratic governments, compared to other forms of government, pay more importance to the views of the public on policy and the preferences towards different political parties, whereas authoritarian governments have a love-hate relationship with public opinion polling. When these governments are weak in their ability to deliver policies, but require public support, they would begin to twist public opinion by generating discourses in their favor.

3.18 Hong Kong public opinion polling began in the 1960s. After the 1967 riots, the British Hong Kong government conducted a series of polls to understand people’s well-being and economic situation, as references for promoting and assessing different policies. These polls however largely went unnoticed by society or the media. As the issue of Hong Kong’s sovereignty came on the agenda, institutional democratization induced more academic institutions, political and civil organizations to conduct public opinion polls to understand people’s policy preferences and voting intentions. Although the media is keen to report different opinion polling results, the quality of these polls in terms of research design varies, and whether they accurately reflect public opinion remains to be examined. There is therefore a need to establish a set of professional standards for opinion polling in Hong Kong.

3.19 The World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) revised their Guideline on Public Opinion Polls and Published Surveys in August 2014. The Guideline requires the groups or organizations conducting the polls to increase the transparency of the polls, so as to allow the public to clearly understand the basis of the public opinion numbers. Below are WAPOR’s thirteen requirements for any group or organization when publishing results of public opinion polls:

1. The name of the organization conducting the poll and its sponsor
2. The universe effectively represented, i.e. the target sample
3. Sample size and geographical coverage
4. Polling date
5. Sampling method
6. Polling method
7. Weighting
8. Percentage of respondents who give “don’t know” answers
9. The relevant questions asked
10. Clarify any ambiguity in question wording when readers interpret the findings
11. When tabular data are given, the full question wording must be included, together with all weighed answers including “don’t know/refuse to answer”
12. A general indication of the placement of a key question and its context should be provided if it follows other questions that may impact on the way that question is understood by respondents
13. Where the questions form a part of a more extensive or ‘omnibus’ survey, this must be made clear to any enquirer, including a general indication of the placement of the questions in the questionnaire

3.20 Out of the thirteen requirements from the WAPOR Guideline, we consider the first seven items to be mandatory requirements in assessing public opinion polls in this study. Any poll which does not meet these requirements will not be included in our analysis.

Observation and Analysis

3.21 Over the past many months, many major events have become turning points in the overall movement and shifted public opinion. While people had mixed feelings in April, public opposition to the extradition bill became obvious and continuous as the movement developed. Meanwhile, people’s focus also shifted to the relationship between the police and the public. The Yuen Long “White-clad People Incident” on July 21 and the “Prince Edward MTR Station Incident” on August 31 became the major focal events that drastically elevated people’s attention towards the conduct of the Hong Kong Police Force. With the deteriorating relationship between police and the public, peoples’ satisfaction ratings of the Hong Kong Police Force drastically dropped. Satisfaction rating fell from 61 points in early June, prior to the onset of the anti-extradition bill movement, to 34 points in early August (Figure 3.2). These indications suggest that people were not only worried about personal and public safety, they became increasingly concerned with the structure of police authority, and the balance and institution of power.

3.22 Despite withdrawing the Extradition Bill, the anti-extradition bill movement remained vocal with the remaining four demands. People not only saw the threat of the Extradition Bill amendment, they also became very concerned with the brutality and conduct of the police, and the antagonism between the people and the police. Although the Chief Executive withdrew the bill and conducted one community dialogue on September 26 in order to salvage public trust, there was no sign that these moves had repaired the mistrust of the people towards the government and the police.
3.23 Public anger was further fuelled by the plunge of the popularity of the Chief Executive and the HKSAR government to their record lows. Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s support rating dropped from 43.3 in early June to 25.4 in early September, then down to 20.2 in mid-October, registering an overall drop of 23.1 points over 4 months (Figure 3.3). Peoples satisfaction of government performance also went from a net value of -16.8 percentage points in February at the launch of the Extradition Bill amendment legislation, down to -53.3 percentage points in mid-June after the first week of massive protests, then further down to -68.7 percentage points in mid-October, registering a total drop of 51.9 percentage points over our study period of 8 months. The Public Sentiment Index dropped from 66.6 in early June to 50.5 in mid-October, registering an overall drop of 16.1 points in four months (Figure 3.4). The political and economic appraisal sub-indices also dropped to their new lows since 1992 and 2003. Under such a prolonged period of mistrust between the people and the government, the governance crisis would only continue to deepen, as the antagonism between people on one side and the government and the police on the other side continue to aggravate.
Chapter 4: Rallies and Processions

Description and Configuration

4.1 A total of 212 instances of marches, rallies and protests happened in the study period\(^5\). Political groups and opinion leaders could be divided into two large camps, namely, the anti-extradition bill camp and the pro-extradition bill camp. The former demanded the government to respond to the protesters’ five key demands, notably to fully withdraw the Extradition Bill, retract the label of June 12 protests as riots, establish an independent commission of inquiry, release all arrested protesters, and seek the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam which later became a demand to restart the process for constitutional reform. Meanwhile, the other camp supported the HKSAR government in amending the Extradition Bill, and subsequently issued the anti-mask law. People in this camp argued that Hong Kong should not become a refuge for criminals, criticized the escalating violence of protesting tactics in the past few months, as well as blamed external forces for intruding in Hong Kong and Mainland affairs. They further supported the Hong Kong Police Force in enforcing the law in order to stop violence and curb disorder.

4.2 Among the anti-extradition bill camp, marches, rallies and protests were initiated by diversified individuals and groups. However, the CHRF was the primary political organization responsible for initiating large-scale marches and rallies with attendance between 12,000 to 2 million. Furthermore, the CHRF claimed that attendance figures on June 9, June 16 and July 1 exceeded the record attendance of 500,000 of the July 1 march in 2003. Other than some medium and small scale protests organized by political parties when the Extradition Bill began to gain attention, quite a number of other rallies and protests among this camp were organized by the civil society at large. These civil society organizations and individuals included netizens, ordinary people, professional groups and individuals, post-secondary student associations and secondary school concern groups, district-based concern groups and many individuals organizing under their own name. The focus of these groups and individuals have also kept in pace with the development of the anti-extradition bill movement. Their activities included various surrounding campaigns, sit-ins, and petitions from the middle to the end of June (like surrounding government buildings day and night on June 12, 17, 20, 21, 26 and 27, and submitting petitions to foreign consulates on June 26).

4.3 Actions in July and August consisted of major marches and rallies in various districts (e.g. the Kowloon march, Liberate Tuen Mun Park action, Sha Tin march, Tsuen Kwan O march and East Kowloon march). These events also involved staging obstructions to major public infrastructures (such as surrounding the Legislative Council, sit-in at

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\(^5\) HKPORI-PCF PSR Online Reference at [https://www.pori.hk](https://www.pori.hk)
the Revenue Tower, and the so-called “Fly with You” gatherings at the Hong Kong International Airport). Professional organizations and groups from different social sectors launched different rallies, marches and flash demonstrations against the Extradition Bill (like the “Hong Kong Mothers Anti-Extradition Bill Gathering”, “Silver Hair Silent March”, rallies by medical professionals, “Civil Servants Siding with People Gathering”, lawyers’ rallies, and so on).

4.4 From August to October, different post-secondary student unions and secondary school concern groups, along with trade/workers unions and the general public initiated general strikes, class boycotts and market closure. Besides that, netizens, citizens and students also initiated other sorts of mass activities like human chains, mass singing and concerts at schools, shopping malls and on the streets in different districts. Responding to major social events, many groups and individuals organized dynamic rallies, marches and protests in quick response. These include “Liberate Yuen Long” to protest against the police’ handling of the “July 21 White-clad People Incident” which happened in Yuen Long MTR station, the flash rallies and marches in Central, the “October 6 Anti-emergency Law Rally” and “Kowloon Revolution”. There were also many immediate campaigns to oppose Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s implementation of the anti-mask law.

4.5 On the other hand, several groups and organizations in the pro-extradition bill camp also held marches, rallies and protests. The largest and most well-known ones included those organized by Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance, pro-establishment Legislative Councillors and other well-known political figures. They organized several large-scale events like the “Support Hong Kong Police, Protect the Law, Maintain Tranquility” rally, “Safeguard Hong Kong” rally and the “Clean Hong Kong Campaign” organised by Legislative Councillor Junius Ho. Other professional and business groups also launched marches such as the “Safeguard Hong Kong, through Wind and Rain” action co-organized by the Hong Kong Taxi Drivers and Operators Association and Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance, as well as the coach bus “slow drive” march by the Hong Kong Tourism Association. Furthermore, several civic society groups within the camp also organized medium and small scale marches and rallies, like the “Surround Public Building” campaign organized by Politihk Social Strategic, which surrounded Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), and the pro-extradition bill marches organized by “Defend Hong Kong Campaign” and “Public Group”.

4.6 Figure 4.1 shows that the number of relevant protests reached a peak in September totalling 71 instances, comprising 34% of rallies and processions within the study period. In August and October, relevant rallies and processions also reached 48 and 39 times respectively, comprising 23% and 18% of rallies and processions within the research period respectively. These instances were mainly large to medium scale rallies and marches organized by the anti-extradition bill camp. By attendance size, large and medium scale rallies and processions were most frequent among the
anti-extradition bill camp, comprising 27% and 64% of their events (Figure 4.2). On the other hand, those organized by the pro-extradition bill camp were mostly medium and small size rallies and processions, comprising 29% and 58% of their rallies and processions respectively (Figure 4.3).

![Number of Rallies and Processions within the Anti-Extradition Bill Camp and Pro-Extradition Bill Camp by month](image)

**Figure 4.1.** Number of rallies and processions within the Anti-Extradition Bill camp and Pro-Extradition Bill camp by month

![Number of Protests, Rallies and Processions of the Anti-Extradition Bill Camp](image)

**Figure 4.2.** Number of protests, rallies and processions of the Anti-Extradition Bill camp, by attendance size and by month
Large-scale Rallies and Processions

There was a total of 53 rallies and processions involving over 10,000 people during the study period, which are regarded as “large-scale rallies and processions” in this report. Among these events, 20 of them even had an attendance of over 100,000 people, 17 of which were organized by the anti-extradition bill camp while 3 of them were organized by the pro-extradition bill camp.

On March 31, the CHRF and pro-democracy councillors launched the first anti-extradition bill march. The CHRF claimed that 12,000 people participated in it, while the police counted peak attendance at 5,200 people. Participants included various tertiary institute associations, professional groups and independent student organizations. Participants called out slogans such as “No Extradition Bill” and “Extradition to the Mainland makes Hong Kong a dark prison”. On April 28, the CHRF launched the second anti-extradition bill march, and claimed that 130,000 people attended, while the police said peak attendance was 22,800 people. Both figures outnumbered attendance of all marches since the 2014 Occupy Movement. The CHRF attributed the high attendance to the sentencing of the nine members involved in the Occupy Movement, and four of whom pleaded the public to oppose the Extradition Bill before they went into jail. If the government refused to withdraw the Bill, then a demonstration surrounding the Legislative Council Complex would be launched, according to the CHRF.
On June 9, the CHRF launched the third anti-extradition bill march. Protesters walked from Victoria Park to the Government Complex in Admiralty along major streets and sidewalks such as Hennessy Road and Lockhart Road. They were completely covered by people for more than 7 hours. The CHRF announced that 1.03 million people participated in the march, shattering the former record of 500,000 people participating in the July 1 march in 2003 to become the largest scale rally since the handover. The police estimated 240,000 people at its peak. Commissioned by the Hong Kong Development Centre, Dr Francis Lui of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology estimated that attendance ranged from 187,000 to 212,000 people. March attendees chanted slogans demanding the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill and for the Chief Executive to step down. At the end of the rally, some protesters initiated a demonstration surrounding the Legislative Council Complex and got into confrontation with the police. Some protesters attempted to barge into the building, and the police eventually dispersed the crowd with pepper spray and batons.

Several thousand protesters gathered in the evening of June 11 outside the Legislative Council Complex and stayed overnight. On the morning of June 12, tens of thousands of protesters out of their own initiative rushed onto Lung Wo Road, Harcourt Road and Queensway, using crowd control barriers to block the roads while chanting “withdraw”. In the afternoon, the police started to disperse the crowd using pepper spray, bean bag bullets, rubber bullets, and tear gas. The level of weapons used was equivalent to that in the 2014 Occupy movement.

On June 16, the CHRF initiated another march demanding the government to withdraw the Extradition Bill. The CHRF also put forward five major demands, including the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, investigation into police shooting, amnesty for all protesters, retraction of the label of June 12 riot, and the resignation of Chief Executive Carrie Lam. The pro-democracy legislative camp also demanded the government to immediately initiate work on a one-time extradition agreement regarding the Taiwan murder case. The march went from Victoria Park to the Government Complex, with many people joining mid-way. Because so many people rushed onto the main arterial sections of Gloucester Road, Lockhart Road, Jaffe Road and Johnston Road, the MTR at one point closed down its Causeway Bay and Tin Hau MTR stations. The CHRF announced that 2 million people attended the march, while police estimated that peak attendance along the original route was 338,000 people. Commissioned by the Hong Kong Development Centre, Professor Francis Lui of the Hong Kong University for Science and Technology estimated an attendance of 400,000 people, while Professor Ron Hui of The University of Hong Kong tentatively estimated that there were at least 1.5 million, and Professor Michael Tse of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University estimated the figure should be around 1.26 million. Into the night, several thousand protesters occupied Harcourt Road and Lung Wo Road. The police did not clear the occupation.
On June 30, Legislative Councillor Junius Ho and Politihk Social Strategic organized an assembly at Tamar Park, with the theme of “Support Hong Kong Police, Protect the Law, Maintain Tranquility”. The organizers claimed that 165,000 people attended, while the police estimated peak attendance at 53,000. Attendees of the rally applauded the Hong Kong Police Force for being restrained and professional in their actions, while they condemned the protesters surrounding the Police Headquarters as disregarding the law and demanding the police to hold hardcore protesters accountable for their actions. A number of pro-establishment legislative councillors, entertainers, and former police officials attended, including former Commissioner of Police Tang King-shing, and former Deputy Commissioner of Police Peter Yam.

On July 1, the CHRF organized the annual July 1 march. The theme of the march this year was “Withdraw the Bill, Carrie Lam steps down”, and reiterated the five key demands from the June 16 march. The CHRF claimed that 550,000 people participated in the march, while the police estimated peak attendance at 190,000 people. The Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute counted that about 234,000 people passed through the footbridge at the intersection of Hennessy Road and Arsenal road in Wan Chai. Adding the estimate of people not passing through this checkpoint, the upper bracket of people joining the march was 374,000. Ming Pao, in collaboration with Cable TV, and a team of academics from The University of Hong Kong and US universities tentatively estimated that 265,000 people participated. Professor Francis Lui of the Hong Kong Science and Technology estimated that 215,000 participated.

People started to initiate rallies at different districts at the first weekend of July. On July 6, the Tuen Mun Park Public Health Concern Group organized the “Liberate Tuen Mun Park” action, demanding the government to address the issues of noise nuisance, indecent singing and solicitation activities. The organizer claimed that over 10,000 people joined the rally, while police estimated peak attendance at 1,800. On July 7, citizen Ventus Lau organized the Kowloon district march, which extended from Tsim Sha Tsui to Hong Kong West Kowloon Station, aiming to inform Mainland tourists of the Extradition Bill incident. Lau claimed that 230,000 attended, while the police announced a peak attendance of 56,000.

On July 13, the North District Parallel Traders Concern Group organized the “Liberate Sheung Shui” march. Concern Group convenor Leung Kam Shing announced that 30,000 people participated, while the police stated a peak attendance of 4,000. On July 14, netizens called for a Sha Tin district march and rally, and a local group Sha Tin Commons together with Sha Tin District Councillor Billy Chan applied for a letter of no-objection. At night, the conveners announced that 115,000 joined the rally, while the police stated a peak attendance of 28,000. As the march ended, protesters and riot police faced off in the area around Sha Tin town center. Protesters were chased into Sha Tin New Town Plaza, while the police surrounded many entrances and exits around Sha Tin MTR station. Subsequently, the protesters and
police confronted each other inside the central atrium of New Town Plaza. The MTR subsequently announced that trains would not stop at Sha Tin MTR station.

4.16 On July 20, the Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance organized the “Safeguard Hong Kong” assembly in Tamar Park, which consisted of four themes: “oppose violence, support the police”; “protect the law, maintain tranquility”; “oppose confrontation, protect the economy”; and “safeguard Hong Kong, people steam up”. The rally also invited individuals from the political and commercial sectors, professional group representatives and entertainers to speak on stage. The organizer claimed that 316,000 people attended the assembly, while the police put peak attendance at 103,000.

4.17 On July 21, the CHRF initiated another anti-extradition bill march on Hong Kong Island, focusing on the investigation into police brutality and demanding the government to establish an independent commission of inquiry. The CHRF announced that 430,000 people participated, while the police stated that peak attendance following the originally planned route was 138,000. Although the endpoint of the march was set at the intersection of Hennessy Road and Luard Road in Wan Chai, attendees continued onwards, following the route of the July 1 march and headed towards the Government Complex. Some protesters initiated a demonstration at the liaison office, and about 1,000 people joined. They threw eggs and black paint at the gates of the office, smearing the national emblem as signs of protest. They further criticized the government in using the police as shields and abusing protesters, and requested a dialogue with representatives from the liaison office. Into the night, riot police dispersed the crowd, clashed with protesters in front of Central District police station, and subsequently deployed tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse protesters. As the same time, a white-clad mob used clubs to beat black-clad protesters and civilians at Yuen Long MTR station, which was later commonly called the “July 21 incident”.

4.18 On July 26, workers in the aviation sector staged an approximately 10-hour silent sit-in at Hong Kong International Airport. Attendees raised signs that read “Protect my city” and “Establish an independent commission of inquiry”, chanted slogans such as “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times”, raised signs and distributed Chinese and English leaflets to arriving passengers. The organizers claimed that 15,000 people participated in the protest at the peak moment, while the police said there were 4,000 people at that moment. On July 27, one week after the July 21 incident at Yuen Long MTR station, people initiated the “Liberate Yuen Long” march even after Max Chung, the applicant for the march, received a letter of objection from the police. Many people turned out to “shop” in Yuen Long, and many shops and banks in the district were closed. Only restaurants, convenience stores and well-known bakeries remained open. Max Chung later estimated that 288,000 people came out to “shop”. Into the night, the police began dispersing the crowd using tear gas, sponge grenades, and rubber bullets. Later on, the police went into the concourse of Yuen Long station to beat the protesters.
4.19 Marches and rallies occurred in many districts from August 2 to 4. On August 2, civil servants organized an assembly themed “civil servants siding with people” gathering in Chater Garden. Organizers claimed that 40,000 people attended the assembly, while the police estimated peak attendance at 13,000. It was the first time since the handover for civil servants to organize a protest. Many current and former Legislative Councillors and top-tier officials spoke on stage, including former Secretary for the Civil Service Joseph Wong. He said that civil servants in attendance enjoyed the same rights as ordinary people in reasonably expressing their demands as individuals, and should not fear repercussions. On the same day, medical professionals organized another assembly at Edinburgh Place, insisting for the five key demands. They also made four demands relevant to their profession, namely, condemning the Hospital Authority for its failure to protect the confidentiality of patients, condemning the government in quietly consenting the police to abuse their powers in mass arrests, condemning the police in preventing immediate rescue operations, and condemning the police for threatening the lives of paramedics, the press and civilians. The organizers claimed that 10,300 people attended the assembly, while the police estimated a peak attendance of 1,300. On August 3 and 4, some people organized the “Mong Kok re-march” and the “Tseung Kwan O” march, calling for a city-wide general strike on August 5. During the Mong Kok march, some protesters upon arriving Tsim Sha Tsui went for a flash operation which barricaded the Cross Harbor Tunnel entrance, some protesters threw bricks into the Tsim Sha Tsui police station and set fire outside.

4.20 In the morning of August 5, netizens mobilized a non-cooperative movement, resulting in an 8-line MTR shutdown, only to recover around noontime. In the afternoon, anti-extradition bill rallies and general strikes were held in seven districts, including Tuen Mun, Admiralty, Wong Tai Sin, Mong Kok, Tai Po, Sha Tin and Tsuen Wan. The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions Chairperson Carol Ng estimated that the number of workers participating in the strike reached 350,000, with 290,000 attending rallies across various districts. The rallies subsequently turned into blocking traffic, surrounding police stations and staff quarters in nearby areas. Multiple news sources estimated around five to twelve police stations suffered damage or were set on fire.

4.21 From August 9 to 13, netizens called for five consecutive days of assembly at the Hong Kong International Airport. Over 10,000 people attended on the first day, while over 10,000 people joined again on August 12 to protest against the police for its abuse of force against protesters across many districts on August 11, causing a woman to go blind due to a beanbag round shot into her eye. The massive turnout in the protest brought the traffic to the airport to a halt, severely disrupting operations and the Airport Authority announced in the afternoon to cancel all flights of the day. On August 13, roughly 10,000 people continued to protest at the airport. They blocked the departure lounges, and the Airport Authority again announced in the afternoon to cancel all the remaining flights of the day. At night, several hundred protesters
surrounded and strapped a black-clad man suspected to be a Mainland police officer in disguise. The police arrived on the scene and clashed with the protesters.

4.22 Both the anti-extradition and pro-extradition bill camps organized events on August 16 and 17. On August 16, the Hong Kong Higher Institutions International Affairs Delegation and the “Stand with Hong Kong Fight for Freedom” LIHKG campaign group organized “Stand with Hong Kong - Power to the People” rally and brought forward two major demands. The first demand was to urge the U.K. to declare that China had unilaterally violated the Sino-British Joint Declaration. The second demand was to urge the U.K. and the U.S. to sanction ranking officials of Hong Kong who were eroding Hong Kong’s freedom and democracy. The organizers claimed that 60,000 people attended, while the police estimated peak attendance at 7,100 people. On August 17, Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance from the pro-extradition bill camp organized an assembly at Tamar Park in Admiralty with the themes of “Ban violence, rescue Hong Kong” and “Refuse mutual destruction, rescue Hong Kong together”. Their seven demands included: stop never ending illegal marches, rallies and road occupations; stop violent conflicts like hurling molotovs, setting arsons and throwing bricks; stop non-cooperative movement which affected people’s daily life; stop smearing at the national flag and emblem, sabotaging police stations and public facilities; restore the tradition of law and order, and not destroy “one country, two systems” ourselves; people with different political stands should not attack each other; and allow society to return to normal, while government moves forward to reform itself. On the same day, the anti-extradition bill camp organized marches both on Hong Kong Island, and in Hung Hom and To Kwa Wan. The Professionals’ Teachers Union organized a rally of the education sector themed “Protect our next generation, speak from your conscience”. The rally began in Chater Garden and finished outside Government House. The organizer estimated that 22,000 people participated, while the police stated a peak attendance of 8,300. That afternoon, netizens launched the “Liberate Hung Hom and To Kwa Wan” rally, reiterating the five key demands and protesting against the impacts of Mainland tourists on local residents. Rally applicant Timothy Lee estimated over 10,000 people joined the rally, while the police estimated around 3,500 attended.

4.23 On August 18, due to the objection by the police to a march, the CHRF subsequently organized an “ebb and flow” style assembly at Victoria Park, with the theme called “Stop triad violence, cub police disorder”, and reiterated the five key demands. People poured into Victoria Park, and spilled onto the streets, marching towards Central. This was the first weekend in a month where there was no clash between protesters and police. The CHRF estimated that at least 1.7 million people participated in the event, while the police said peak attendance at Victoria Park was 128,000.

4.24 On August 23, people across different districts formed human chains, creating the “Hong Kong Way” to reiterate the use of peaceful, rational and non-violent ways to highlight the determination of Hong Kong people to strive for the five key demands.
The organizers estimated that over 210,000 people participated, forming a 60 kilometer long human chain that was inspired by and in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Baltic Way. On August 25, some people organized the Tsuen Kwai Tsing march. Different news sources reported the attendance to be from several thousands to 100,000. Legislative Councillor Andrew Wan estimated roughly 100,000 people gathered at the Kwai Chung Sports Ground. The rally ended up as another clash between police and protesters. Protesters erected barricades, and police responded with tear gas and pepper pellets. Alongside the riot police and the Raptors, the police also deployed water cannons for the first time to disperse the crowd. On August 28, the Hong Kong Women’s Coalition on Equal Opportunities organized the “Anti-Extradition Bill #metoo” assembly at Chater Garden to protest against the alleged use of sexual violence by the police towards protesters. The organizers claimed that 30,000 people participated in the assembly, while the police said peak attendance was 11,500.

4.25 On September 2, the first day of school, the Hong Kong Higher Institutions International Affairs Delegation staged a school strike gathering at the University Mall of The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Student Unions of 10 tertiary institutions launched a two-week “Boycotting classes but not education” campaign. The organizer claimed that 30,000 people attended. According to The Chinese University of Hong Kong Student Union President Jacky So, this number was higher than any other school strike rally at the university since the 2012 protests against the introduction of moral and national education, and the 2014 Occupy movement. Furthermore, another 20 sectors also launched a two-day general strike call the “three suspensions” (meaning stop work, stop classes, stop the markets) and gathered at Tamar Park, themed as “General strike, Hongkongers no turning back. Five demands, not one less.” The organizers said they had set September 13 as the deadline. If the government would not respond to the five key demands, they would consider escalating their actions. The organizers claimed that 30,000 and 40,000 people joined the events on September 3 and 4 respectively.

4.26 On September 4, Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced the official withdrawal of the Extradition Bill. On September 6, the Social and Political Organization Workers Union organized the “Oppose Arbitrary Arrests, Stop Authoritarian Practice” assembly at Chater Garden to protest against the many cases of police brutality against the protesters, around 23,000 people reportedly attended. On September 8, netizens organized the “Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Prayer Rally”, adopting an “ebb and flow” style to march to the U.S. Consulate to submit petitions urging the U.S. to pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. A variety of news sources reported an attendance of between several thousand to the organizer’s preliminary estimates of 250,000 people. After the rally and march, police and protesters again faced off in various parts of Hong Kong Island.

4.27 On September 15, despite objection from the police, the CHRF continued to hold a rally across Hong Kong Island, with 100,000 people reportedly joining. In the
afternoon, some people sabotaged MTR station facilities, and threw bricks and molotovs to police stationed in the Government Complex in Admiralty. The police dispersed the crowd with multiple rounds of tear gas and water cannons. Riot police showed up and forced the protesters to retreat to Wan Chai and Causeway Bay.

4.28 On September 27, people gathered at Edinburgh Plaza in Central to stand in solidarity with arrestees held at San Uk Ling Holding Centre, and called on the public to keep paying attention to the issue of police brutality. The organizers announced 50,000 people attended the event, but the police said peak attendance was 9,520. On September 28, the 5th anniversary of the Occupy movement, the CHRF organized an assembly in Tamar Park. It estimated that between 200,000 to 300,000 people attended the event, a record high of similar events in five years. The police later said peak attendance was 8,440 people. On September 29, netizens organized the “Global Anti-Totalitarianism” rally, with the theme of “Connect the World, Fight Tyranny”. Newspapers reported “large crowd of people” participated but no eyeball estimate was reported. Judging from different photographs, there should be 1,000 to 10,000 people in the march. When the rally first started, police attempted to disperse protesters using tear gas. The march proceeded towards the Government Complex. Police moved in to disperse the crowd, deploying water cannons and arresting protesters.

4.29 On October 1, the CHRF organized the National Day rally with the theme “No National Celebration; Only Remembrance”. Despite the objection from the police, Albert Ho from the Democratic Party, Leung Kwok-hung of the League for Social Democrats, Figo Chan from the CHRF, staged a rally under their individual capacity in place of the CHRF to lead the march on its planned route. The protesters re-iterated the slogan “Five Demands, Not One Less”. The CHRF estimated that around 100,000 joined the rally. Upon arriving at Western District, riot police fired multiple rounds of tear gas to disperse the crowd. Aside from this march, netizens also called for protests across six districts, which led to clashes between police and protesters in Wong Tai Sin, Sha Tin, Tuen Mun, Tsuen Wan and Sham Shui Po. Police fired six real bullets that day. In Tsuen Wan, one police officer fired a live round at a secondary 5 student at close range and hit his left chest. This student became the first protester shot by a live round in the anti-extradition bill movement. Close to midnight, the MTR announced the closure of 47 stations, constituting over half of all stations in the system.

4.30 On October 3, sources revealed that the government was ready to use the power granted by the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to implement the Prohibition on Face Covering Regulation (commonly known as the anti-mask law) that would come into effect immediately on October 5. Around noontime on October 4, roughly 10,000 people gathered at Chater Garden to protest against the anti-mask law, which in turn occupied a portion of Connaught Road Central. Protesters chanted slogans such as “no crime in wearing masks, no reason behind the legislation” and “Hongkongers, Resist”. In the afternoon, Chief Executive Carrie Lam made an announcement of passing the anti-mask law. In response, people marched in various districts. Into
the night, protesters erected barricades and started fires, and some people destroyed facilities in MTR stations and stores with Chinese-backed capital. That night, the MTR announced a shut-down of all lines. On October 6, some people organized the Anti-Emergency Regulations Ordinance march. Several thousands to tens of thousands of people marched from Causeway Bay to Wan Chai. Meanwhile, netizens organized the “Kowloon Revolution” march, starting in the Tsim Sha Tsui area and proceeding through Mong Kok and Prince Edward. That afternoon, police fired tear gas to disperse the crowd. Later that evening, Causeway Bay, Wan Chai, Mong Kok and Kowloon Tong stations were sabotaged.

4.31 On October 14, on the eve of the tabling of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act before the U.S. House of Representatives, some people called a “Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act Rally” at Chater Garden to urge the U.S. to pass the Act. The organizers claimed that over 130,000 people joined. The police said peak attendance was 25,200 people. On October 20, the CHRF’s originally planned Kowloon march was opposed by the police. Despite opposition, the CHRF’s vice-convener Figo Chan and some former pro-democracy legislative councillors took over to call for the march in their personal capacities. The theme of the march centered on demanding the government to respond to the five demands and to abolish the anti-mask law. Chan later claimed that over 350,000 people participated in the march.

Concept and Introduction

4.32 Rallies and processions have long been a way for Hong Kong people to express their views and participate in politics in an orderly manner. Historically, the largest protests in Hong Kong are all linked to national issues.

4.33 Before the handover in 1997, Hong Kong had two super-scale marches and demonstrations. One was the “cross-island march” held on May 21, 1979. Various news sources reported that 1 million people joined the march. The goal of the march was to show solidarity with the student-led democracy movement in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and to protest against the Beijing government’s implementation of martial law. Another super-scale march took place one week later on May 28 when “Global Chinese marches” around the world further showed solidarity with the movement in Beijing. On that day, the newly established Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China organized a march in Hong Kong. Reports estimated that close to 1.5 million people participated in the event.

4.34 After the handover, the right to organize assemblies, processions and demonstrations are protected by Article 27 of the Basic Law. However, the Public Ordinance also regulates this right, such that if the number of people participating in an assembly goes over 30, then one must apply for a letter of no objection from the Hong Kong Police
Force. According to police figures, the number of rallies and processions increased from 4,222 cases in 2009 to 11,436 in 2019, or 2.7 times over ten years⁶.

4.35 On July 1, 2003, because the HKSAR government proposed to move forward the National Security Bill (provided by Article 23 of the Basic Law), a large number of people participated in the march on Hong Kong Island. The Public Opinion Programme at The University of Hong Kong estimated that close to 429,000 to 502,000 joined the march. The police estimated around 350,000, while the CHRF estimated around 500,000. Since then, the CHRF has been holding marches on the day of the handover on July 1 to demand for democracy in Hong Kong. Despite the different attendance estimates between the CHRF, the police and academic institutions, it can be said that the July 1 march is the largest annual procession for Hong Kong people to fight for democracy.

4.36 Nevertheless, Hong Kong’s electoral reform and pace towards democracy has been sluggish, as many years of rallies and processions bore no fruit, some people finally proposed in 2013 to occupy the major streets of Central as a sign of civil disobedience, in the hope that the central and HKSAR governments would fulfil their promise to implement democracy in Hong Kong.

4.37 Occupy Central with Love and Peace co-founder Benny Tai stated that, “Civil disobedience became a way to understand that people can truthfully grounded in justice, not just for personal gain but for societal gain, to engage in open, intentional and limited acts of breaking the law, to try and change an unjust system”. To garner people’s acceptance for the legitimacy of civil disobedience as a tactic to fight for fairness and demands, civil disobedience actions have to be non-violent, exhausted all other legal means to reach the objective, and satisfied proportional and reasonable chances of succeeding. People who engage in civil disobedience are more obliged to accept the responsibility for their crime to show that they respect the law”. Based on this understanding, the focus of civil disobedience is not about whether one has violated the law, but why to violate the law. Similarly, organizations, or protesters organizing or participating in rallies and processions must pay a greater cost than voting or petitioning. If it entails civil disobedience, then participants would have to face the consequences for their criminal penalties, and thus have to pay a greater cost.

4.38 For the anti-extradition bill movement in recent months, it began when the CHRF and other political parties launched rallies and processions in opposition to the Extradition Bill. In preparation for the June 9 anti-extradition bill march, the CHRF threatened that if the government would not withdraw the Bill, it would escalate its action to mobilize people to surround the Legislative Council Complex to prevent the second reading of the Extradition Bill. Despite 1.03 million people CHRF said to have

attended the anti-extradition bill march on June 9, the Chief Executive’s unwavering attitude to proceed with the Bill became the flashpoint for the anti-extradition bill movement. The movement has highlighted the extensiveness of civic conscience. Regardless of one’s age, profession or religion, and especially among the youth, one was able to join the movement with the same feeling, causing the emergence of self-initiated actions across different districts and social sectors.

4.39 The anti-extradition bill movement tested the public’s tolerance of hardcore protester tactics. On the one hand, most protesters insisted on using peaceful, rational and non-violent means to organize and participate in rallies and processions of various scales. On the other hand, hardcore protesters considered their use of violent means to be caused by the inherent injustices within the current system, compounded by years of government negligent to the peaceful rallies and processions joined by hundreds of thousands of people, sometimes over a million. To them, this is the only way they can make the government respond. As the movement evolved, the principles of “leaderless” and “no pointing fingers, not abandoning each other” resonated as mottos. Eventually an attitude of banding and leaning upon one another was fostered and became a core value and ingredient of the movement.

4.40 Aside from this, the longevity of this movement is inextricably linked with the use of new media platforms. Compared to movements in the last century, contemporary social movements differ in the use of web-based platforms, including social media applications to facilitate collective action. Any person can become a netizen. When netizens band together to discuss society and politics and are provided with a platform to raise political demands, these platforms can become sites for organizing social movements. Netizens could become movement strategists, campaigners, media distributors, and executors. This balance of strategizing and launching actions, with the on-the-ground execution of actions, reinforce each other to propel social movements.

**Observation and Analysis**

4.41 Since June, large numbers of people have come onto the streets to express their opposition to the Extradition Bill. The anti-extradition bill movement further expanded in a variety of ways. Core to the movement, the five key demands became expressed in a variety of different ways, such as marches, rallies, demonstrations, surrounding a place, prayer meetings, general strikes, human chains, mass choirs and petition campaigns. These rapid uptakes hoped that the government would respond to their demands. Through major incidents such as the July 21 incident in Yuen Long, the August 31 incident in Prince Edward MTR station, and October 1 marches on National Day, these trends indicate that after major societal incidents, protesters not only directed their attention towards the government, but also towards the police and their management. This resulted in a series of clashes and violent escalations between protesters and police.
4.42 As the anti-extradition bill movement enters its sixth month, public support has been on the high side, in terms of general support for the five key demands, especially towards establishing the independent commission of inquiry. This reflects that public sentiment has seeped into different socio-demographics, sectors and arenas of Hong Kong society. It eventually took more than two and a half months for the Chief Executive to officially withdraw the Bill. Various commentators and scholars considered the responses from the Chief Executive being too late. Over the course of the movement, the government allowed various issues to simmer, including the unprecedented “white-clad people” incident of indiscriminately attacking ordinary citizens, and uncountable conflicts between the police and the people. Simply withdrawing the Extradition Bill did not help.

4.43 The escalating use of force by the police in handling protesters and dealing with protest tactics has received much scrutiny. On the demonstration surrounding the Legislative Council Complex on June 12, the use of multiple rounds of tear gas, rubber bullets and pepper pellets to disperse protesters was immediately perceived by the protesters as a violent use of force, marking the beginning of the worsening relations between the police and the people. The five key demands not only included the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, but also the retraction of labeling the June 12 protest as a riot, and the investigation into the use of force by the police. As protest tactics escalated, the police explained that they had to use equivalent levels of force to combat these levels of violent acts. Police drawing out guns, deploying water cannons and firing a live round at a protester in October normalized the level of violence in protester versus police confrontations. When the people saw no fair investigation of the white-clad mob incident, but that the police was selectively enforcing the law, people and protesters considered this a collusion between police and the village-triads. This incident became the turning point in the movement and laid the ground for the developments of the movement in August, September and October. Public opinion polling also showed that the public satisfaction towards the police dropped significantly. People were less tolerant of police’s use of force than that of the protesters.

4.44 The mode of protest has shifted, reflecting people’s pro-activeness in self-initiating protest, and the spirit of “no centre stage”. In March and April, at the beginning of the Extradition Bill controversy, the activities of the anti-extradition bill camp were confined mainly to the protests initiated by the CHRF. Then, aside from June 9, June 16 and other centralized forms of protests, the movement morphed into a movement sustained by self-initiating individuals or groups. The protesters used different ways to express their demands. For example, various individuals, civil and professional bodies organized rallies and processions. In July and August and later into the movement, netizens seeped into various districts with rallies and processions, large and small. Different rallies also turned into more hardcore protests, including barricading entrances of tunnels, road blocking, and attacking police stations and vandalizing Chinese-backed stores to express dissatisfaction towards the police and supporters of police. Pro-democracy camp opinion leaders and political organizations did not
interfere, but rather became a mediator and overseer of the clashes between police and civilians, thus becoming a line of support for protesters. What started as peaceful rallies and processions, evolved into “flash” protests, vandalism of public facilities and protesters throwing molotovs. Although some people believed that these protesters used excessive force, some have raised their tolerance towards the forceful tactics of hardcore protesters. The anti-mask law implemented in October seemed to have little effect in deterring protesters from engaging in unauthorized rallies and processions.

4.45 The protesters used a variety of tactics to sustain the movement. They used social media to distribute messages, such as the “protest schedule” to let people organize and participate in low-cost strategic protests. The number of large-scale rallies and processions reached a peak in June. As the movement developed, rallies and processions became more frequent and more decentralized. Students became the major participants in the movement, such as the High Schoolers School Strike Platform organized by Demosisto together with many secondary school concern groups, and the student unions and concern groups from many tertiary institutions. The movement also mobilized a large number of groups and individuals from the medical, financial, insurance, social welfare, education, legal, aviation, and civil service sectors. Different groups self-initiated various activities according to the social situation and in their own capacity.

4.46 The pro-extradition bill camp primarily used centralized means to mobilize people, in the hope of creating counter-rhetoric in response to the continuous mobilization from the anti-extradition bill camp. From March to June, the pro-extradition bill camp had some relatively small-scale activities. Only until June to August did the pro-establishment camp organize three major rallies. The organizers of the activities concentrated in the pro-establishment camp, business sectors, and other pro-Beijing groups and individuals. Compared to the anti-extradition bill camp, the expansiveness and representation of the pro-extradition bill camp was relatively confined.
Chapter 5: Campaigns via Traditional Media

5.1 In general, people use traditional media, such as newspaper, television and radio, to express political demands. However, with the growing trend of online social movement as a model, mobilization via traditional media may also require the use of the internet, to a certain extent. The definition of “traditional media” has become more ambiguous ever since. Having considered these factors, the following analysis of mobilization during the study period took into account the broader definition of tradition media which includes all ways of expressing one’s political demands or stance without the use of the internet.

5.2 The campaign analysis of this chapter covers various activities usually reported by the traditional media, including petitions, crowdfunding and newspaper advertisements, manifestations of human chains and mass choirs, “Lennon Walls”, slogans used in protests, general tangible support activities, peoples’ press conferences and so on.

Description and Configuration

Petitions

5.3 Because the number of petitions happened in study period was huge and in view of limited time, we covered only petitions that received broad coverage and placed under the main categories.

5.4 On May 25, the CHRF launched a petition “Global Signing: Against Extradition to China”, which gathered more than 590,000 signatures. Aside from this, more than a hundred civil society organizations and individuals launched similar anti-extradition bill petitions. These included professional groups, different community, religious, human rights and other kinds of groups. Post-secondary, secondary and elementary school concern groups and related individuals also launched petitions. The petitions signed by the secondary and primary school sectors comprised more than 222,000 current students, alumni and staff members from over 400 schools, those signed by post-secondary students, alumni and staff members are estimated to comprise at least 35,000 signatures.

5.5 Groups within the pro-extradition bill camp also launched similar petitions. On April 16, people from the industrial and commercial, legal, technological and grassroots sectors formed the “Unison Support for Extradition Bill and Justice Group” and launched the “Safeguard Hong Kong Public Safety, Support Extradition Bill Petition”.

7 See HKPORI-PCF PSR Online Reference at https://www.pori.hk for the list of petitions, mainly covering those submitted by groups or individuals supporting or opposing the Extradition Bill.
As of June 14, the Group claimed that over 935,000 people signed the online petition. The “Safeguard Justice, Support Extradition Bill Alliance” subsequently formed the “Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance” on July 21. In response to the government’s implementation of the anti-mask law, the Alliance initiated the “Anti-black Clad Violence, Anti-Mask, Protect Our Home” online petition. As of October 20, the Alliance claimed that over 250,000 people signed the petition. Aside from the main petitions from Safeguard Hong Kong Alliance, the “Protect Electoral Reform, Against Occupy Central Signatories Group” launched the “Rejection of Violence in Legislative Council” petition on May 12 and claimed to have collected over 1,500 signatures in one day.

5.6 Aside from the proactive petitioning from both camps, former high-ranking officials, civil servants and councillors also published four joint petitions in June and July. The petitions urged the government to seek reconciliation and handle the matter with restraint. They demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, retraction of classifying events on June 12 as riots, and establishment of an independent commission of inquiry.

Crowdfunding and Newspaper Advertisements

5.7 LIHKG users launched three rounds of crowdfunding to place advertisements in widely influential newspapers of at least 10 neighbouring or western countries and regions. They aimed to increase the awareness of the Extradition Bill and Hongkongers’ demands among the international community.

5.8 In mid-June, LIHK users started to raise fund via “GoGet Funding” to place advertisements in newspapers around the world during the period of the G20 summit. The crowdfunding campaign raised more than HK$6.7 million within 9 hours, surpassing its goal of HK$3 million. The initial rounds of advertisements were published in The Guardian of the U.K., Süddeutsche Zeitung of Germany, Washington Post and New York Times of the U.S.A., The Globe and Mail of Canada, and the EU web version of Politico. The advertisements mentioned the government’s nonresponse to two peaceful protests in June each with over one million people joining, it also reiterated the key demands of retracting the classification of June 12 events as riots, and the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry. They urged different governments to step up their pressure towards China.

5.9 In mid-August, LIHKG users launched another round of crowdfunding in the hope of further raising the awareness of the international community on the Hong Kong situation, particularly the allegedly excessive use of force by the police. They fundraised over US$1 million. Advertisements were placed on August 19 to 20, in newspapers of 10 countries and regions, such as The New York Times in the U.S., The Globe and Mail in Canada, and Le Monde in France. In September, netizens
launched the third round of crowdfunding and raised over HK$8.5 million. Advertisements were placed in newspapers of 9 countries ahead of the National Day of China. The aim was to call the people in these countries to put pressure on their governments to demand the Chinese and HKSAR governments to respond to the five key demands, and also to echo the theme of the “Global Anti-Totalitarianism March” to resist Chinese influence in other countries.

5.10 The HKSAR government also ran one offshore newspaper advertisement. After announcing the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, the HKSAR government placed a full-page advertisement in the Australian Financial Review, saying that the government was committed to supporting “one country, two systems”, open to dialogue across sectors, and reiterated its determination to guard the safety of Hong Kong.

5.11 Different well-known individuals also published rare advertisements in local newspapers in response to issues arising from the Extradition Bill incident. On August 20, Gordon Wu from Hopewell Holdings published a full-page advertisement. Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing also published two advertisements. Li first published two versions of a full-page advertisement in several local newspapers on August 16. One version used a story from Chinese history which warned people not to keep picking on wounds. Another version of it stressed anti-violence, with horizontal and vertical headers “Best intentions can bring worst outcomes”, “Stop anger with love”, “Love of freedom, forgiveness and rule of law”, and “Love of China, Hong Kong and oneself”. Li subsequently published a second advertisement together with his son Richard Li on September 5, under the theme, “Protect one country two systems, stop violence, restore order”.

**Human Chains and Mass Choirs**

5.12 Since August, there were more frequent appearances of self-initiating human chain and mass choir activities. For example, netizens organized the “Hong Kong Way” on August 23. It was estimated that more than 135,000 people participated in the 60-kilometre chain, stretching over Lion Rock, Victoria Peak, “Garden Peak”, and three main MTR lines. The Hong Kong Way was a replicate of the 2 million strong Baltic Way human chain in 1989, where people fought to break away from the Soviet Union. The organizers issued a statement that urged the government to uphold “one country, two systems”. They hoped other countries and Hong Kong people stand together for unity, despite the difference between “peaceful” and “valiant” protesters. Other groups followed suit, and began incorporating human chains into their districts and schools, such as the September 5 human chain activity involving over 100 secondary schools.
The popular song “Glory to Hong Kong” composed by the people and beloved by the anti-extradition bill camp was frequently played in many street and shopping mall performances and mass choirs. It was also used in conjunction with human chain activities. In response, the pro-extradition bill camp also launched similar activities where their supporters sang the Chinese national anthem. There were news reports that during some of these activities turned into scuffles between the two camps.

Lennon Walls and other protest symbols

On June 12, the day where protesters surrounded the Legislative Council Complex, a Lennon Wall re-appeared outside the Government Complex. That was a significant landmark during the time of Occupy Movement in 2014, it was now covered by messages and slogans like “Anti-extradition”, “Withdraw the evil law”, “Hong Kong add oil”, “Insist till the end”, “I love my city” and so on.

Lennon Walls originated in Prague of the Czech Republic, people who opposed the communist regime put on John Lennon-inspired graffiti, pieces of lyrics from Beatles’ songs, and other designs relating to local and global causes to symbolize their pursuit of peace. The Hong Kong version of the Lennon Wall filled with not only people's demands to the government, but also encouraging messages to fellow Hongkongers. It became a message board showing anti-extradition bill promotion materials and ventilated public anger.

Lennon Walls began to appear in many parts of Hong Kong, such as local streets, footbridges, tunnels, shopping malls, and Councillor offices. Walls were posted with protest slogans, photos from the internet, “LIHKG pigs”, encouragements in support of the protesters in order to assert the five demands and to express dissatisfaction with the HKSAR government and Hong Kong Police Force. The pedestrian tunnel leading to Tai Po MTR Station was popularly referred to as Lennon Tunnel, becoming one of the biggest Lennon Wall displays in Hong Kong at one point.

In mid-August, LIHKG netizens, on behalf of a group of people who were passionate about art and design, crowdfunded over HK$200,000 to construct the Lady Liberty statue. The group explained that the statue symbolized the bravery and strength of Hong Kong people amidst gunshots to fight against the anti-extradition bill. The statue was carried to the streets and to Lion Rock at different times.

Furthermore, people folded origamis in peaceful gatherings. Participants of human chain activities have also used Pepe the Frog as a symbol of solidarity with protesters, redefining the perception of Pepe and its associations with alt-right nationalist movements and racial discrimination in the Western world.
Other Physical Support: Materials, Frontline Medical Support, “Free-rides” and Promotion of “Yellow Economy”

5.19 Movement supporters and people donated various materials, such as frontline gear, food, drinks, and money to protesters. During the events, supporters were often seen at the back, forming a human supply chain to pass water and umbrellas to the frontline protesters.

5.20 In addition, people from all walks of life volunteered to provide various support to the frontline protesters. Among them, frontline first aiders are most visible. Some individuals self-initiated “free-ride” services to deliver supplies to the scenes and also send protesters away from the scenes. The most significant days were July 21 when individuals helped young protesters escape from Yuen Long MTR station, and also September 1 when many drivers helped to vacate people from Lantau Island after they joined the Airport sit-in.

5.21 Furthermore, members in the anti-extradition bill camp also initiated the “Yellow Economy” campaign in the hope of infilling protest tactics into daily lives. They encouraged people to patronize shops that support the movement (the “yellow shops”) and boycott those that supported the government or the police, or were backed by Chinese capital (the “blue shops”). Some netizens even created special maps which showed “yellow”, “blue” and “green” shops to help other protesters join their campaign.

Citizens Press Conference

5.22 Since August, netizens periodically held Citizens Press Conferences. These conferences directly responded to recent events, invited key opinion individuals from the anti-extradition bill camp to make presentations, and sometimes released polls of opinions from people within their camp. Twenty such press conferences were held during the study period, and the media provided extensive coverage of them.

Concept and Introduction

5.23 Traditional media has been used in previous mass movements in Hong Kong to spread the messages of different camps. Launching petitions has been one of the major ways to express public sentiments. At the same time, each camp has been building on the foundations laid in the 2014 Occupy Movement and made Lennon Walls a civic platform for expressing demands peacefully and rationally. Another consequence of the 2014 Occupy Movement was the heightened sense of political divides, and the political stereotyping of “yellow” and “blue” ribbons. In the aftermath of the Occupy Movement, this political consciousness has remained in the daily lives of the people.
Observation and Analysis

5.24 The use of traditional media in campaigning is one of the key features at the beginning of the anti-extradition bill movement, and raised the international community’s awareness of events in Hong Kong. The many petition activities before the 1 million people rally on June 9 helped raise the public awareness of the Extradition Bill. Netizens then tried to push the petitions and advertisements to an international level in the hope of attracting international attention to Hong Kong in terms of its basic freedoms, its democratic development and its deteriorating rule of law.

5.25 Compared to the 2014 Occupy Movement, the anti-extradition bill movement has amassed large number of material and monetary resources to fuel the movement. Furthermore, because the threshold for participation was self-selected, this criterion enabled multitudes, ranging from different sector professionals, students, parents and children, even the “silver haired” elders to find their own ways to support the movement. This heightened sense of civic responsibility was further highlighted in the enormous rate of participation.

5.26 There are also signs that the movement has entrenched itself into Hong Kong society. The Citizens’ Press Conference has become a staple in generating rhetoric and directing the public anger towards the HKSAR Government, and subsequently towards the Hong Kong Police Force. At the same time, we also witness the rising sentiment for boycotting Mainland corporates brands and the so-called “blue shops”, with some radical protesters going further to sabotage these premises. There has yet to be a fine line drawn on acceptable tactics.
Chapter 6: Campaigns via New Media

6.1 New media could be defined as online platforms that allow interactions and exchanges among users. They include Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, Telegram, websites for promotion and forums. These platforms played a crucial role in the anti-extradition bill movement, such as enhancing communication and mobilizing support. In particular, the uses of the LIHKG forum, Telegram and Twitter in the movement have received the most attention. This chapter thus explores their roles in the movement.

Description and Configuration

LIHKG forum

6.2 The LIHKG forum was one of the major communication platforms in the movement. Founded in 2016, the users of the forum appeared to come from diverse backgrounds but were primarily young Hongkongers. With identities kept anonymous, they disseminated information, discussed future actions, as well as conducted evaluations and discussed the direction of the movement. By interacting and giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down, forum users decided on the most popular and relevant topics and set the focus of the forum.

6.3 The forum was seen as one of the thrusts of the movement since June. As a matter of fact, LIHKG users started noticing the Extradition Bill in March. In April, there was a spike in discussion regarding the Extradition Bill, such as the severity of the subject matter and sharing of information regarding the anti-extradition bill rally organized by the CHRF. In May, users even started tangible mobilization. They called people to set up street counters, created promotional materials and leaflets like “lazy packs,” put up posters, and launched petitions to the White House.

6.4 Later into the movement, users organized rallies in various districts, replacing traditional political parties and individuals in their roles in assembling the people. Sometimes, they even rescheduled their rallies in view of the actual circumstances. Meanwhile, they also took prompt responses to breaking social events. They

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8 See Lee et al. (2015) and Chu (2018) for further analysis.
9 https://lihkg.com/thread/1078313/page/2
11 https://lihkg.com/thread/1154786/
12 https://lihkg.com/thread/1147431/
13 https://lihkg.com/thread/1161780/
15 https://lihkg.com/thread/1170196/
16 https://lihkg.com/thread/1159639/
crowdfunded for advertisements to be put up in multiple countries, as well as reminded participants of the October 20 Tsim Sha Tsui march not to attack South Asian people and to protect Chungking Mansions and Kowloon Mosque.

6.5 The forum also brought together people to form groups for further action. Since August, LIHKG forum users held “Citizens’ Press Conferences”, trying to shift people’s focus back to the demands of the movement and to respond to comments from the Hong Kong Police Force and the government. Other LIHKG users formed a political alliance called “Hi! Freedom” which consists of 30 people, who ran for District Council Elections in Kwun Tong, Southern and Sham Shui Po districts.

6.6 LIHKG forum users have also sought to include more people in the loop, such as by creating a version of the forum for seniors\(^\text{17}\), and creating channels on Reddit\(^\text{18}\) to reach overseas and English-speaking audiences.

6.7 Based on our focus groups, there were young participants who used LIHKG as the primary means of obtaining information or to learn about other people’s opinions:

(1) “I usually go on LIHKG. Why do I choose LIHKG but not other media? Because I think news reports have to be reviewed and so some time has already passed when they are finally published. You can really see what is happening live and others’ immediate reactions on LIHKG. Thus I would constantly check on LIHKG to catch up with the latest developments.” (2) “After the conflicts, I would go back to LIHKG and see how most people thought of the incident.”

6.8 Despite the prevalent use of LIHKG forum among participants of the focus groups to read the threads, less than half of the participants said they took part in the discussions.

Telegram

6.9 Telegram became a primary communication platform for the movement. Messages sent through “secret chats” are encrypted end-to-end and self-destruct timers can be set to delete messages after being read, making it seemingly more private and secure than other instant messaging platforms. Also, users can use usernames instead of phone numbers to start conversations with others, meaning that people’s phone numbers can be kept private. In addition, “channels”, one-way broadcasting groups, can be set up and can have an unlimited number of members. Votes can also be launched on Telegram, allowing for quick polling of people’s views.


\(^{18}\) [https://lihkg.com/thread/1199526/](https://lihkg.com/thread/1199526/)
6.10 The use of Telegram is not new in Hong Kong protests. It was used in the 2014 Occupy movement. Not only were the messages used for daily communication, but they were also used in organizing on-the-ground activities, and adapting in response to the situation and upon challenges. Whereas Telegram was largely used among the hardcore protesters in 2014, The use of Telegram in this movement had proliferated to general smartphone users. However, some people also reported being overwhelmed by the vast amount of information.

6.11 The use of Telegram in the anti-extradition bill movement could be classified into various types, including for general discussion, news coverage, scouting and traffic information, designing promotional materials, resources pooling, doxxing, and so on. The membership size of the largest channel could reach as high as close to 200,000. Various digital and online media outlets, political parties as well as student organizations have also set up their own Telegram channels.

**Twitter**

6.12 Twitter has been argued to have fueled social movements in the last decade, such as Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring. This time too, Twitter was noted by many as one of the key sites of message dissemination by the anti-extradition bill camp to overseas audiences.

6.13 Supporters of the anti-extradition bill movement were preliminarily observed to have used the following hashtags: #hongkong, #hongkongprotests, #hkprotests, #antiELAB, #standwithHK, #freedomHK, #weareHongKongers, #sosHK, #antimasklaw, #FollowBackHongKong, #hkpolice, #hkpoliceestate, #policebrutality, #hkpoliceviolence, #hkpoliticterrorism, #teargas, #光復香港時代革命, #五大訴求, #手足互科, #手足科勞, #圍爐.

6.14 To explore the relationship between the use of hashtags and the major events in the first four months of the anti-extradition bill movement, a trend analysis was conducted looking into six hashtags (#hongkongprotests; #antiELAB; #antimasklaw; #hkpoliceestate; #hkpolice; #freedomhk) that brought our attention at various points using a tool developed by Crimson Hexagon.
As shown in figure 6.1, the peak usages of #hongkongprotests and #antielab, the two most often used hashtags, generally coincided. Their uses saw major rises on June 12 and from then on they fluctuated together and surged when there were major protests, which usually happened every weekend. For #freedomhk, its use spiked on June 28 and August 19 due to advertisements being put up in major news outlets in various countries. Likewise, the introduction of the anti-mask law led to the rise of the #antimasklaw hashtag around October 3, 4 and 5. Interests in #hkpolice and #hkpolicestate picked up in late August, and rose at the end of September and at the start of October, peaking respectively on October 13 and 20. The overall trend shows that contents about the movement on Twitter increased over time and with the use of different hashtags for different major events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hashtags</th>
<th>Total Posts</th>
<th>Date of Peak Postings</th>
<th>Posts on Date of Peak Postings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#hongkongprotests</td>
<td>2,759,274</td>
<td>October 20</td>
<td>139,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#antielab</td>
<td>1,714,864</td>
<td>August 31</td>
<td>71,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#antimasklaw</td>
<td>256,406</td>
<td>October 5</td>
<td>47,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#hkpoliceestate</td>
<td>263,807</td>
<td>October 13</td>
<td>21,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#hkpolice</td>
<td>485,348</td>
<td>October 20</td>
<td>38,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#freedomhk</td>
<td>443,292</td>
<td>August 19</td>
<td>34,006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1. Hashtags, total posts, and date and volume of posts on days of peak postings.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\) Caution is advised in referencing the exact large numbers, as the data is only exploratory and has yet to be fil-
6.16 Another way to examine how Twitter was used was to examine the top retweets. Retweets allow for fast reposting of original content, and allowing user to insert their own views to continue and enrich the discussion. One of the most common hashtags used by protesters was #hongkongprotests. It was found that the top influencer was Hong Kong Free Press, with a follower base of 231k. The top retweet went to Alexandre Krauss on August 12 on military activity which took place north of Hong Kong in Shenzhen\(^20\), which received 47.5k retweets and 73.4k likes (Figure 6.2a). The second top retweet from Alex Hofford on July 28 on the innovative tactics of protesters in combating tear gas\(^21\), which received 34.5k retweets and 90.1k likes (Figure 6.2b).

![Figure 6.2. (a, left) Tweet by Alexandre Krauss on August 12, 2019; (b, right) Tweet by Alex Hofford on July 28, 2019.](image)

6.17 Hong Kong activists have also used Twitter to engage overseas audiences. LIHKG forum and its associated Telegram channels were active in introducing members to the basic commands of Twitter, and particularly on how to effectively push the Hong Kong protests to trend\(^22\). However, protesters’ uses of Twitter was not totally effective. Many users tweeted in Chinese, thereby limiting the reach to the overseas audiences. LIHKG users were observed to follow each other but were unable to expand beyond their networks. There were instances where other Hong Kong-based Twitter users would provide guidance or tips to such users.

\(^20\) [https://twitter.com/alexandrekravetz/status/1160947525442056193](https://twitter.com/alexandrekravetz/status/1160947525442056193)
\(^21\) [https://twitter.com/alexhofford/status/1155514310308896768](https://twitter.com/alexhofford/status/1155514310308896768)
\(^22\) [https://lihkg.com/thread/1488630/](https://lihkg.com/thread/1488630/)
Observation and Analysis

6.18 New media has become the new normal of social movements in Hong Kong. It is the platform for both internal and external communication. Internally, it synergized with the decentralized and bottom-up nature of the movement. The use of new media, the LIHKG forum and Telegram in particular, facilitated ordinary people in becoming significant stakeholders in the movement. Externally, Twitter was used as a platform to communicate important information about the movement to the international community.
Chapter 7: Focused analysis on Youth Opinions

Description and Configuration

Stage 1: Quantitative Survey

7.1 The first question of our Stage 1 survey (conducted in late July 2019) asked directly whether respondents opposed or supported the Extradition Bill proposed by the government. Results showed that close to 70% of all participants either very much opposed (56%) or somewhat opposed (13%) the Bill. About 7% of participants were in the middle, 7% somewhat supported and 12% very much supported the Bill. Age analysis further revealed that, over 90% (91%) of those between 14 and 29 years old opposed the Bill which was the highest among all age groups. 72% of those between 30 and 49 years old opposed the Bill, 65% of those between 50 and 64 years old opposed the Bill and the opposition figure was the lowest among those aged 65 or above which was 47% only. Meanwhile, opposition to the Bill seems to be highly correlated with the respondents’ education level where 83% of those with tertiary education or above opposed the Bill, 67% of those with secondary education, and 49% of those with primary education or below opposed the Bill. Further, for those with primary education or below, 6% were in the middle, 29% supported the Bill and 17% did not know. And, for those who participated in the protests of the Bill, as many as 96% of them opposed the Bill whereas only 53 % of the non-participants opposed the Bill, 29% supported the Bill, 11% in the middle and 7% no idea.

7.2 When it came to the most important factors that had contributed to Hong Kong’s current governance crisis, CE Carrie Lam, the HK Police Force, and the Central Government took the top 3 places and their overall rating was 7.6, 7.1, and 7.1 marks respectively, out of a 10 point scale, where 10 meant ‘very important’, 5 ‘half-half’ and 0 ‘not important at all’. In descending order, the other contributing factors were the China Liaison Office, John Lee (Secretary of Security), Teresa Cheng, (Secretary for Justice), Executive Council, Pro-Establishment camp, youngsters, Pro-democracy camp, and external forces, with an overall rating ranging from 4.7 to 6.8 marks. The sub-group analysis trends were similar to that of question 1. Respondents aged between 14 and 29 years old gave much higher ratings to CE Carrie Lam, the HK Police Force, and the Central Government as the most important factors causing the governance crisis than other age groups. Those older than 65 years of age rated the entire list of possible factors lower than other age groups while their highest score went to the Police Force (6.9). For education level, respondents with higher education levels rated the CE Carrie Lam, the HK Police Force, and the Central Government much higher than those with less education. And, between the participants and non-participants of the Bill protests, the participant group gave higher ratings to all factors listed except the youngsters, pro-democracy camp and external forces. The only factor that respondents rated below 5, out of the 10 point scale, was external forces (3.4).
7.3 The respondents were further asked whether the lack of universal suffrage, Central Government intervention, and institutional violence were factors contributing to the present crisis. Overall, the respondents rated these 3 factors between 6.5 and 6.8 marks on a 10 point scale, where again 10 meant ‘very important’, 5 ‘half-half’ and 0 ‘not important at all’. Young respondents aged between 14 and 29 rated the lack of universal suffrage and Central Government’s intervention as the most important factors, scoring 7.8 and 8.0 respectively. On the other hand, those who did not participate in the protests rated all factors generally lower than other groups, with an average rating between 5.8 and 5.9 only.

7.4 On the performance of the Police in handling the mass incidents triggered by the Extradition Bill, overall speaking, 60% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction. And same as some previous observations, over 90% of the young respondents aged 14 to 29 (91%) were dissatisfied with the Police’s performance. Yet only 34% of respondents aged 65 or above thought the same, with 20% in the middle, and 43% reported satisfaction with the Police’s handling. Same pattern was observed for the education breakdowns that those with tertiary education level or above showed highest dissatisfaction (78%) and those with primary education level or below showed highest satisfaction (32%) towards the Police.

7.5 Next, in terms of their assessment on the performance of the protesters, respondents were asked whether they thought the protesters were restrained or resorted to excessive violence. Results showed that 29% of the overall sample were of the view that the performance of the protesters was restrained, 25% were in the middle, and 44% thought the protesters resorted to excessive violence, including sometimes and often. The trends observed in age and education groups were similar to that of the previous questions. More young respondents thought the protesters were restrained (43%), with another 30% in the middle, and 26% thought they resorted to excessive violence. And the corresponding figures for respondents 65 years old and above were 20%, 23% and 53%. Obviously their views were opposite to that of the young group. As for education, the percentage of those who thought the protesters used excessive violence decreased with education (with 56% for primary, 48% for secondary and 31% for tertiary).

7.6 With regard to the protesters’ demands of this anti-extradition movement, first of all, 79% of respondents supported the demand to call for an independent commission of inquiry. 73% thought the Bill should be completely withdrawn. On related matters, 63% called for a restart of the constitutional reform process, 59% demanded that the protests should not be labelled as riots. Next, 50% thought CE Carrie Lam should step down, and 46% supported to release the arrested protesters. As with the previous sub-group analyses, a much higher proportion among the young respondents, tertiary educated people and those who participated in the protests supported all these demands than their counterparts. Taking the set-up of an independent commission of inquiry as
an example, as high as 92%, 88% and 97% of these 3 sub-groups respectively showed support to this demand.

7.7 When asked the reasons behind young people’s dissatisfaction, the most commonly cited answers of the overall sample were distrust of the Central Government (81%), distrust of One Country, Two Systems (75%), distrust of the CE (75%), and their pursuit of democracy (71%). Among respondents between 14 and 29 years old, over 90% believed the distrust of the Central Government was one major reason (91%), the other 3 reasons were not far behind all attaining around 85%. On the other hand, only 67% of those 65 years and above believed the youngsters’ dissatisfaction was mainly caused by their distrust of the Central Government and also the One Country, Two Systems.

Stage 2: Qualitative Focus Groups

7.8 Views gathered from the Stage 2 focus groups showed that an overwhelming majority of the young people interviewed supported the anti-extradition bill movement and sustained high levels of interest in acquiring information related to the movement. Key information sources included mainstream media outlets, social media, Telegram, and the LIHKG forum. Some participants said they would also pay attention to people with opposite views. Many participants often shared information about the movement, participated in discussions, and engaged in various ways in the movement, such as participating in assemblies, rallies, strikes, petitions, donating money or supplies as well as writing on Lennon Walls.

7.9 Here are some direct-quote statements extracted from the focus group participants:

“In my friends circle, basically when we see each other we talk about these things. Often we meet up on Saturdays or Sundays which is when different rallies take place.... My friends in this age group, we all know what’s going on, so our conversations essentially revolve around these events/issues”

“No doubt a majority of people at my age are “yellow ribbon”, or would support this movement. Actually I don’t see anyone in my age group who don’t support but I do see many people who are indifferent to the issues ...as if they were living in a parallel universe....they would not mention a single word of what has happened in the past two months.”

“There was a period where I kept watching every night, even if there was no protest out there, the online discussions just didn’t stop, so I would keep following. It really tires you out, so I just... I don’t know if you know about Telegram. There are some channels that keep popping up. I would just turn off all notifications so that I can escape for a while.”
“Apart from reading from sources that align with my views, actually I am really curious what people from the other side think, like what was said by others just now, some people have said the protesters were paid. And some started to doubt the cause of injury of that female protester’s eye... Actually I was really curious why they would think of that? So I would sometimes check out their pages too to learn more.”

7.10 From the focus group discussions, there were a few recurring points as summarized below:

7.10.1 Young people felt that the movement failed to get some across-the-board support from the non-young generations. Some older people thought the movement would not succeed, so would persuade the young people not to participate, while others would even oppose the movement. Disagreements over the movement between young people and their families, especially parents, seriously jeopardized the relationship and harmony with their family members.

“I may try to change topic as some of their comments are really difficult to take in. Sometimes it’s really irritating, some makes my heart pounding, and I would want to get away by going to the washroom, or going out for a walk.”

7.10.2 Young people first participated in the movement solely because of their opposition to the Bill, while later the reasons expanded to their dissatisfaction of the government’s total neglect of the public’s voices, and then their discontent with the Police Force, along with the broader constitutional issues. Among all, responses to police brutality and negligence towards people’s demands evoked the strongest emotional reactions.

“Up to this moment, the reason why we keep coming out is because our bottom line is being trampled upon one after another. It’s not just the government but also the law enforcers. They are bending the rules to their liking, to the point they have absolutely overridden the law.”

“At that time, I still had a bit of hope for the Police. At least for some emergency situations, we could still rely on their help. However after the 21 July incident, I realized the Police would not do that... For the August 11 incident, I saw the guy who was clearly pinned to the ground. There was also a pool of blood, but he was still held down by the Police who pressed his head against the floor. At that moment I thought, is that necessary? (Began crying) I now realized not only that the Police could not protect us, they would even hurt us. I was disheartened by this. Why has Hong Kong become like this? I was raised up with kids of my age would still say, ‘When I grow up, I want to be a police’. But now, Hong Kong people would view the Police with shame.”

“I think what makes me most angry is that what you do bears no consequences. For protesters, what you face is a maximum of ten years imprisonment under rioting charges. But then, the Police have done so many unlawful things, but
there is nothing that can overrule them....what can you do to ensure that they receive the equivalent treatment under law, or some consequences? There aren’t any.”

7.10.3 Acceptance and tolerance level were found to be very high towards the anti-extradition bill demonstrations and protests. Many people believed that as long as protesters did not harm civilians or innocent people, they can accept all kinds of force and will not distant from the protesters. They also strongly agreed that a “leaderless movement” was better.

“Till death (atomic bomb) do us part!”

“I do not mind you shooting the Police with a real gun, but I am rather against using violence against those innocent citizens. I can accept whatever actions if they are directing right towards the regime or the Police only.”

“I somewhat agree that, after occupying the LegCo building, there was a statement “It is you who tell me peaceful marches do not work” as written on the pillar there. I think it got the point, I went to demonstrations peacefully, but you ignored me, and used tough means to suppress me. Then I had no other choice but to escalate my actions, it was you who forced me to do so.”

“I think it is good not to have a “central stage”, because protests can happen in any form anywhere. But then, at the same time, we have to keep reviewing. Without a “central stage”, there need to be continuous feedback, ideas and everyone has to help think of solutions and suggest for improvement.”

7.10.4 Young people in general were pessimistic about the result of the movement. They thought the government would not accept the five demands at the end. Regarding the “five demands are indispensable”, they had different thoughts though.

“If we do not grasp the momentum of the movement to get our demands answered, we may not have another chance to fight for these demands again. This is why ‘five demands are indispensable’.”

“I do not agree on ‘five demands are indispensable’, because it is an ‘Utopia’... No doubt the most ideal situation is fulfilling all the demands but the government will not do so.”

“I think setting up an independent commission of inquiry is the most basic thing to do, then people will think what to do next. However, this is just one of the five demands, I doubt whether the movement will end even if this demand is answered.”

“Let’s see what the investigation will reveal, people will continue to observe the situation. Of course people will be relieved a bit and need not go to
demonstrations every week.”

7.10.5 Young people were pessimistic about the future of Hong Kong. Quite some of them hoped the political situation in China would get improved, and some were also considering migrating to other countries.

“I am quite pessimistic and the most pessimistic part is that the result of this movement does not lie in Hong Kong people’s hands. Facing such a strong enemy – the Communist Party, Hong Kong people’s power is not strong enough to have a decisive battle.”

“I hope the Communist Party will be collapsed by 2047. Of course, we, Hong Kong cannot do much to end it. I hope that it will end by itself, or maybe someone from USA fight against it. If the Communist Party still exists in 2047, I believe Hong Kong will become a municipal or just a province under China.”

“It is normal to think about moving to other countries. It is because in Hong Kong, even now, I feel like I am no different from a second-class citizen... I will become a second-class citizen if I move to other countries. I’m a second-class citizen even if I stay in Hong Kong, then why not move to other countries?”

Deliberative Meeting Findings:

7.11 The pre- and post-deliberation survey findings were described first, followed by views collected from the group discussions of the Deliberative Meeting (held on August 24, 9:30am to 3:30pm).

7.12 Prior to deliberation, 68% of the participants very much opposed to the Extradition Bill proposed by the government and gave 0 score, on a 0-10 scale. After deliberation, this percentage increased further to 76%. In examining the percentage of participants that opted for 0 to 4 marks on the scale, the percentage slightly increased from 95% to 96%. With regard to the performance of the Police, 99% of participants showed dissatisfaction (by choosing 0-4) prior to deliberation, which decreased slightly to 97% after deliberation.

7.13 Participants’ support for all “five demands” was found to be very high in general. On the complete withdrawal of the Bill, those who chose “very much support”, which is 10 on a 0 to 10 scale, was 81% before deliberation and became 83% after deliberation. The overall ‘support’ figure, somehow, decreased slightly from 92% to 89%. On setting up the independent commission of inquiry, those who indicated “very much support” (10 marks) decreased from 72% to 67% after deliberation. The overall support also dropped from 97% to 94%. On the need for a constitutional reform, those who gave 10 marks decreased from 71% to 69%. However, the overall support for
constitutional reform increased from 85% to 92%. This was the largest increase among the five demands and its mean score jumped from 8.7 to 9.0. On not labeling the protests as riots, those who indicated “very much support” decreased from 69% to 67% while the overall support figure for this demand increased from 92% to 96%. And, the last demand of releasing the arrested protesters, the “very much support” figure remained the same at 57% before and after deliberation, and the overall support slightly increased from 89% to 90%.

With respect to the possible ways forward for the movement, first of all, to dismiss the principal officials responsible for the work related to the Bill, participants who opted for “very much support” (10 marks out of a 0-10 scale) decreased from 53% to 49%. And so, the overall support figure also decreased from 88% to 84%. Participants were also asked if Chief Executive Carrie Lam should step down because of this incident. Those who chose “very much support” slightly decreased from 33% to 32%, but the overall support increased from 71% to 72%. As to whether there should be public consultations that represent people of Hong Kong, participants who gave “10 marks” dropped from 27% to 22% and the overall support decreased sharply from 64% to 50%. This was the most substantial drop registered and its mean score has dropped from 6.5 to 5.7 marks. The remaining two items received much less support among the participants – only 16% before deliberation, and 29% after deliberation, who showed support to letting things unfold naturally. At the same time, its opposition rate decreased from 64% to 53%. Finally, regarding the PLA intervention, the support figure for this increased slightly from 15% to 16% while the overall opposition rate decreased from 71% to 68% after deliberation.

Observation and Analysis

Stage 1

Overall, the Stage 1 survey results revealed that almost 70% of Hong Kong people opposed the Extradition Bill. Younger and higher educated respondents are more opposed to the Bill and felt more dissatisfied with the current situation. There was a clear differentiation between respondents who were younger and older, who were more educated and less educated as well as who were protest participants and who were not. However, it is important to note that while there were differences, the overall sentiment was in opposition of the Bill, albeit some demo groups had much stronger views than others.

The CE Carrie Lam, the Police Force, and the Central Government were named as the most critical factors contributing to the governance crisis at the time. External forces were considered to take up an unimportant role among all groups.
7.17 60% of the people were dissatisfied with the overall performance of the Police in handling the mass incidents. Views on whether the protesters were restrained or have resorted to excessive violence were divided, though more people tended to think excessive violence had been in place.

7.18 All the major demands of the anti-extradition bill were supported to a great extent by the public. Among these demands, setting up an independent commission of inquiry and complete withdrawal of the Bill received across-the-board support. Young respondents’ views were found to be different from other sub-groups, while it is generally believed their dissatisfaction mainly stemmed from their distrust of the central government, the “one country, two systems” principle and the CE as well as their pursuit of democracy and freedom.

Stage 2

7.19 Combining young people’s views expressed in the focus groups and the Deliberative Meeting, participants were increasingly more concerned and agitated regarding the Extradition Bill. The prolonged protests created more confrontations between the people and the government.

7.20 Prolonged protests and anger among young people drove them to challenge and rebel against the frontline police officers. This sentiment of combating institutional violence with people violence had a spiral effect in escalating violence in all levels of our society. The heightened conflict between the police and the people triggered more young people to resort to violence as a means to fight for the demands. Slinging stones, setting fire and other actions became justified provided that they did not inflict injuries to the innocent people.

7.21 Our deliberation with the young participants has facilitated certain opinion changes, but most are nominal. Their views with the police and their determination to stand for the major demands, especially the call for an independent commission of inquiry, were already so deep-rooted that more deliberation was not going to change their views much. Regarding the ways forward, young people after deliberation felt more pressing to revive constitutional reform and less insistent on the dismissal of government officials. Meanwhile, more of them thought that government-initiated consultations or dialogues were just meaningless.

7.22 Civic society should build its own dialogue platforms for the CE and the leading government officials to genuinely interact and listen to people’s views, especially the young people.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 The year of 2019 marks the history of Hong Kong and the world not simply as a year of social unrest and people’s rebellion within a tiny city under the rule of China, it is a story of the East clashing with the West.

8.2 The index event of the movement happened on February 13, 2019 when the HKSAR government introduced the Extradition Bill amidst severe opposition from some Legislative Councillors. While the government later amended the Bill in response to some criticisms from the commercial sector and even the pro-establishment camp, it stopped short of easing the concerns of the general public. On June 9, allegedly one million Hong Kong people took to the streets, and when Chief Executive (CE) Carrie Lam ignored the demand and decided to press on, thousands of people surrounded the Legislative Council on June 12 and violent confrontations started. Three days later, CE announced that she would suspend the bill but refused to withdraw it. By then, police violence came into the agenda, and CE’s prolonged non-response to the protesters drove more people to demonstrate. It took CE more than two and a half months to respond by proposing four measures to answer the core demands including the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill. By then, numerous mass protests had already involved millions of Hong Kong people, and many of the original demands became outdated.

8.3 Due to the massive scale of these activities, Hong Kong society has become more polarized than ever. Starting from a relatively minor mistake of the CE, which could have been corrected within a couple of weeks if not just days after the first mass protest in early June, the anti-extradition bill movement gradually developed into an anti-CE cum anti-police cum anti-authoritarian movement. Meanwhile, as described in Chapter 3 of this report, the entire government sank into a governance crisis never seen before, and the popularity rating of the CE herself dropped lower and lower, each time poorer than the previous historical low.\\n
8.4 Up to the publication date of this Report, it is still an open question whether this anti-authoritarian movement would end up becoming an anti-Beijing cum anti-communist movement if it is not well contained by stakeholders at both sides of the divide.

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23 Hong Kong’s records of leadership popularity started in 1992. A variety of indicators is used to measure the popularity of the last Governor under the British rule, and then the CE under “one country two systems”. Most media cited the popularity scale of 0-100 marks with 50 meaning “half half”. Experience shows that 55 marks is considered “normal”, Carrie Lam scored less than 20 at the time of writing this report.
8.5 From a historical perspective, Hong Kong has only experienced its truly anti-government mass protest starting from 2003\textsuperscript{24}, when more than half a million people\textsuperscript{25} marched peacefully on the street protesting the proposed legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law and demanding the resignation of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa who eventually resigned in 2005. After that experience, Hong Kong people apparently had high hope on the effect of non-violent mass rallies until this anti-extradition bill movement in 2019. Mass violence set in this time after repeated rallies on massive scales failed to achieve their aims. One question being asked by the researchers of this study is: Why has the HKSAR government not learnt from previous experiences and ventilated public anger by making some concessions to the people? Without evidence compiled by any independent commission of inquiry, even the most serious researcher is left with a set of hunches and possibilities like:

- CE Carrie Lam is too arrogant by her character and personality to admit mistakes and make concessions;
- CE Carrie Lam has misread her successes over the past two years in pushing forward various unpopular measures like building the Hong Kong Palace Museum without consultation, implementing the co-location arrangement at West Kowloon, the jump start of some mega reclamation projects before the end of public consultation, and so on, which made her overconfident that she could push through the Extradition Bill in the same manner;
- CE Carrie Lam was hand-tied by the central government to act according to her wishes;
- ....

8.6 There can be countless conjectures but whatever they are, Carrie Lam has clearly misunderstood the symbolic meaning of passing the Extradition Bill, as well as Hong Kong people’s subsequent demands on her to withdraw the Bill and to investigate the police violence. To the people of Hong Kong, the issue at stake is the gradual encroachment and erosion of Hong Kong’s core-of-the-core value – freedom\textsuperscript{26} – and Hong Kong people would fight to the very end to defend their freedoms. When Carrie Lam pushed through the Mainland-Hongkong co-location arrangement at the West Kowloon Station in July 2017 shortly after she came into office, many people had already expressed grave concern on the possibility of Mainland Chinese officials using this co-location arrangement to enforce Chinese laws across the border of Hong Kong. One notable example cited was the alleged secret arrest of Lam Wing-kee, the manager of Causeway Bay Books, in 2016 by Chinese officers or agents operating inside Hong Kong. Lam’s book store sold anti-Beijing

\textsuperscript{24} The riots of 1967 instigated by the Cultural Revolution in Mainland were not considered as representative of Hong Kong people’s sentiment then even by the pro-communist organizers of the riots.

\textsuperscript{25} The number is academically verified.

\textsuperscript{26} The distinction between “freedom” and “liberty” is an important academic and legal discussion, where “liberty” usually refers to the exercise of one’s freedom limited by the rights of all others. However, in the discussion of core values here, “freedom” is taken as a synonym of “liberty” because most Hong Kong people understood that freedom is limited by legal and social constraints.
books which only had a small readership in Hong Kong, but his outlet was seen as a symbol of Hong Kong’s freedom testing the tolerance of the mainland leaders. When Carrie Lam pushed through the co-location arrangement, her government and the pro-establishment camp mistakenly took people’s opposition as a challenge against her leadership, against Mainland China’s sovereignty, and against the entire social and political order of Hong Kong. They mobilized all their resources in the executive and legislative branches of the government, plus the patriotic media under their control, and adopted the “procedures” which subsequently became part of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Co-location) Bill. They do not quite understand that most Hong Kong people actually do not care too much about what books were being sold at the Causeway Bay Books, whether Falun Gong is a subversive religion or not, and whether the co-location arrangement is a national pride or not, most Hong Kong people just want to live freely and if they have committed an offense, be tried fairly and openly.

8.7 It was therefore the fear of losing freedom which had driven Hong Kong people to protest against the co-location arrangement, to fight against the government and the police during the anti-extradition bill movement. Added together the mass rallies of June 9, June 16, July 1, August 18 and October 1 engaged millions of Hong Kong people, many of whom chanted demands for freedom, democracy and the rule of law. From the perspective of Hong Kong people, their continued freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law is the basic tenet of “one country, two systems”, and these freedoms are to be protected by the rule of law guarded by the courts. Learning from modern history, it seems to many of them that freedom and rule of law are best guaranteed under democratic institutions. Therefore, as the movement continued, people’s demand gradually shifted from the controversial content of the Extradition Bill itself to demands for rectifying police injustice and developing universal suffrage, as described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report.

8.8 While some people including the CE herself might have mis-read Hong Kong people’s sentiment, there must be somebody in the pro-establishment camp and even in the think tanks of the central government who understood the situation well. Afterall, Hong Kong is still a free city, so all information including scientific findings of people’s opinion and sentiment is readily available. This brings up another question asked but not easily answered by the researchers of this study: Why has the central government not learnt from previous experiences and made better use of Hong Kong under “one country, two systems”? As political outsiders, the researchers could only come up with these conjectures:

- The central government does not have a think tank to tell them the truth;
- The regime cares more about their survival than people’s well-being;
- The leaders could not find a way out of the philosophical turned practical dilemma between paternalism and egalitarianism;
- …..
Due to the history of China’s development over the past century and the nature of the communist regime itself, it may be not easy for the Chinese leaders and the Chinese people to resolve the dilemmas of communism versus capitalism, paternalism versus egalitarianism, liberty versus responsibility, unity versus diversity, and finally, humanism versus patriotism. According to the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao, social order only changes via violent means and proletariat revolution is supposed to be the final revolution of the human race, before everybody enjoys life in a utopia. The history of modern China, however, has injected the elements of (1) national fights between the Chinese people and the Japanese conquerors, (2) internal fights between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party Kuomintang, and (3) since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the crave for a strong nation to compensate for people’s suffering from late Ching Dynasty to the early rule of PRC. To the central government and many pro-establishment followers in Hong Kong, they consider patriotism and national pride to be their ultimate target, while individual freedoms and human rights can be curtailed, especially when they themselves are not the sufferers. This may explain why many more people in the older generation of Hong Kong are more sympathetic to the central government than the younger generation. Many of these elders have themselves migrated to Hong Kong in escape of communism or have followed their parents doing so. Likewise, there are also those who have newly migrated to Hong Kong but still maintain a paternalistic view of political development where patriotism versus humanism is concerned. However, at the other end, those born in Hong Kong and educated with a global perspective understand the strength of liberty and diversity, those who have experienced genuine freedom understand its power in generating creativity, solidarity and unity based on humanity. Patriotism requires an enemy, humanism does not. Hong Kong being an international city has embraced many global values for a long time. Hong Kong youths have much wider and deeper exposure to the international world than their counterparts fed and bred under the communist system. There is thus no coincidence that when the movement developed to a critical point, the young protesters turned their attention to the international community for spiritual and political support, through proactive media campaigning and political lobbying. These activities were unseen before even during the Occupy movement five years ago.

Likewise, riding on the global trend of cyber development, the anti-extradition bill movement in Hong Kong on a very technical cum practical level has also witnessed the widespread use of new social media like Twitter, Telegram, online local forums like LIHKG and online real-time live broadcasts of mass events, capturing protester violence and police brutality as they occur. Such a proliferation of new media, as described in Chapters 5 and 6 of this report, other than adding strength to the entire movement, has also resulted in an almost complete diffusion of protest leadership. This “lack of a big stage” among Hong Kong protesters especially those young people who spearheaded it can be seen as a direct continuation of the global trend of social
movement starting from the Arab Spring Revolution. Many of the young protesters in Hong Kong have termed this a “Water Revolution” meaning that it does not have a form nor a leadership, and protesters do not follow commands but act individually according to their own conscience and individual understanding of the situation. Put it in a nice way, this is a totally egalitarian movement which has rebelled against paternalism both in theory and in deeds. This made counter-measures taken by the establishment ineffective and out of date. Be it the central government, the local government, the police force or the pro-establishment campaign organizers, they found it difficult to interact with the young protesters except by undercover infiltration, overt police brutality and secretive triad-type suppressions. Even Hong Kong’s number one television media has become powerless in dampening the protests, not to say those communist-led newspapers which could only appeal to their small circle of supporters. This also explains why the central government had to switch on their state and party media to propagate their agenda, on a tiny revolt in Hong Kong. The state is also worried about the proliferation of new media.

8.11 The emergence of new media based on the philosophy of almost-extreme egalitarianism can be a problem in the long run, if put in a worrying way. The lack of leadership and key opinion leaders, the counter-measures of spying and infiltration, and the incitement to violence by undercovers, coupled with fake news generated by cunning forces, can steer the consumers of these news media into enclosed echo chambers, which would jeopardize creativity and humanistic development at its best, and incubate its own paternalism and even terrorism at its worst. This is an important question we generated after compiling Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The answer probably lies in the evolution of a new form of integration based on egalitarian principles – riding on the advanced uses of rational deliberation online and onsite, adoption of peace polls and civil referendums, cultivation of mutual respect bottom-up from the community level, and of course, a timely and serious review of the political system and constitutional arrangements which helps liberate people’s innate commitment to help themselves while helping others.

8.12 To conclude, the anti-extradition bill movement which happened in Hong Kong in 2019 should not be taken as simply a story of Hong Kong people protesting against a specific bill or against a local government, its police force, or even against a regime. It is a clash between liberalism versus paternalism, it is a debate between patriotism

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27 The term was used by many protesters, but the article written by Jamil Anderlini in the Financial Times on September 2 “Hong Kong’s ‘water revolution’ spins out of control” was an impetus. He wrote, “Every revolution needs a name. The pro-democracy demonstrations that have roiled Hong Kong for three months will be known as the “water revolution”. Since massive protests erupted in June, demonstrators have adhered to what they call a “be water” strategy. This pays tribute to Hong Kong’s most famous son and has utterly confounded the police, the government and the politburo in Beijing. “Be formless, shapeless, like water,” said Bruce Lee, the kung-fu movie star and most influential martial artist in history, in a rare TV interview in 1971. “Water can flow, or it can crash – be water, my friend.”
versus humanism. More by historical accident than by design, Hong Kong has become a window between the East and the West for more than a century. During this period, the world saw the end of the Ching Dynasty in 1911 overthrown by a national hero educated in Hong Kong\textsuperscript{28}, the first genuine cultural revolution of China in 1919 – the May Fourth Movement which advocated science and democracy, the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and all the goods and bads which followed, the Cultural Revolution under the PRC between 1966 and 1976, the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, the beginning of the “one country, two systems” experiment starting from 1997, and since then a series of mega scale protests and movements sparked by clashes of deep rooted values. Fortunately, such clashes are still well contained within the framework of civility and absence of the military.

8.13 From 1919 to 1949 to 1989 to 2019, the history of China and Hong Kong has been punctuated by exclamation marks each followed by a semi-colon. What would happen next is probably beyond the tele- or microscopes of the social scientists. However, what can be learnt from Hong Kong now and before should be of great practical value to Hong Kong, China and the world.

\textsuperscript{28} Sun Yat-sen who overthrew the Ching Dynasty and is respected as the “Father of the Nation” by both the Nationalists and Communists studied at the Diocesan Boys’ School in Hong Kong in 1883, then at The Government Central School from 1884 to 1887, and then proceeded to study at the Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese which was the forerunner of The University of Hong Kong. Sun had repeatedly told people that most of his revolutionary and modern ideas were inspired by his experience in Hong Kong.
Postscript

Part One

PS.1 The study period of this Public Sentiment Report was from February 13 to October 22, 2019 covering exactly 36 weeks. While the start date appears obvious, the end date is not. When this study project was planned in July, there was no idea when the movement would end. Nevertheless, after the mega scale mass rallies of June 9, June 16 and July 1, and in light of the government’s non-response to people’s demands, it was felt that another one or two months may be needed for the dust to settle, so the study period was set to end on the last day of August, and a public sentiment report should be compiled by the middle of October concurring with the beginning of a new policy year. People’s general expectation then was that all public protests would subside after the summer holidays, before the Legislative Council reconvened.

PS.2 All expectations were proved wrong as the movement got fuelled continually by triad violence and police brutality, apparently with the blessing of the top leaders. The researchers therefore had to extend the study period time from the end of August to early October and then late October, one week after the CE gave her policy address of the year (which was already one week behind the original schedule). The movement still continued but the researchers have decided to wrap it up, since they had already extended the study period for two more months.

PS.3 After cutting off data collection on October 23, and before publishing the first edition of this report on December 13, more protests and demonstrations occurred, punctuated by an election. This postscript documents briefly some major events which happened during this period and discusses their implications if any on the main findings.

PS.4 On November 12, after unrest broke out throughout the territory triggered by the call for a citywide strike and class boycott, riot police besieged The Chinese University of Hong Kong, firing tear gas and projectiles almost at will, while protesters set up roadblocks at a footbridge at the edge of the campus.

PS.5 On November 17, again as a result of conflict between protesters and police triggered by the call for strike and boycott, riot police besieged Hong Kong Polytechnics University for the next 13 days and arrested almost 1,400 people.

PS.6 November 24 was the election day of the Hong Kong District Council. A record turnout of 2.94 million people was recorded giving a super-high turnout rate of 71.2% never seen before in any direct elections in Hong Kong. The democrats won 388 out of the 452 seats and became the majority camp in 17 out of 18 District Councils. According to an opinion survey conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Program...
after the election, most voters have treated the election as a quasi-referendum of the Movement and casted their votes in support of it.

PS.7 It is difficult to estimate how much of the democrats’ landslide victory on November 24 was due to events happened before October 23 as documented in the main body of this report, and how much of it was due to the events listed in this postscript. However, judging from the stagnancy of CE’s popularity figures over this period so as shown in the following table, it was rather unlikely that the events happened after October 23 have affected the result of the election too much.

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PS.8 In other words, after more than six months of frequent and widespread protests, the anti-extradition bill movement has apparently consolidated strong support from the Hong Kong people in demanding the government to protect their freedoms, to honor the promises of the Basic Law, and to maintain Hong Kong’s position as an international city between the East and the West. Such demands are clearly seen in peaceful elections, mass protests, and if needed be, aggressive fights.

PS.9 The final event recorded in this postscript – the “World Day of Human Rights Rally” which took place on December 8 allegedly participated by 800 thousand people – can also be seen under this light as part of an ongoing campaign to solicit international support for the protection of personal freedom.

Part Two

PS.10 Shortly before the first edition of this report was published on December 13, 2019, it was felt necessary to write a postscript to briefly record relevant events which happened after October 23 the cut-off date of this study up to the publication date of December 13. At that time, nobody knew when this movement would end, so a rather pragmatic cut-off date was set to facilitate publication and documentation. However, after a month or so, it became obvious that history has taken a detour away from this political movement to another crisis which affected not only Hong Kong and China but
all countries worldwide – the outbreak of a pandemic called “Wuhan Pneumonia” at first and “2019–20 coronavirus pandemic” at the time of completing the revised edition of this report, on March 31, 2020. The research team therefore decided to enhance the “postscript” of the first edition of this report, which was published on December 13, 2019 by adding a “post-postscript” which documents the events leading to either the “natural ending” or “temporary suspension” of this movement, until history unfolds itself again.

PS.11 To keep things simple, the research team has compiled a chronology of events spanning from October 24, 2019 to March 31, 2020 using the previous method of event collation, namely, counting the number of headline stories in all newspapers and set those events with over 25% daily coverage as key event(s) of the previously day. When a chain of events can be lumped together, like those related to the spread of the coronavirus pandemic, they are grouped together in single entries. The following chronology shows how events related to the anti-extradition bill movement has rapidly died down in Hong Kong due to the emergence of the pandemic:

Fading away of the political movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Reports</th>
<th>Important Events (of the previous day, with over 25% coverage of newspaper headlines and commentaries on the following day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23/10/2019</td>
<td>Chan Tong-kai is released from prison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/10/2019</td>
<td>The High Court grants an interim injunction to restrain unlawful publishing of the personal data of police officers and their family members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/10/2019</td>
<td>Nomination of Joshua Wong for District Council election is ruled to be invalid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11/2019</td>
<td>Protests and conflicts break out on Hong Kong Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/11/2019</td>
<td>Junius Ho is attacked with a knife.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/11/2019</td>
<td>HKUST student who fell from a carpark in Tseung Kwan O passes away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/2019</td>
<td>Protests and conflicts between protestors and the police occur in multiple districts in Hong Kong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/11/2019</td>
<td>A traffic policeman fires three live rounds at a protester.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/2019</td>
<td>Violent conflicts between protestors and the police occur in the Chinese University of Hong Kong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/11/2019</td>
<td>The Education Bureau announces that classes will be suspended as conflicts continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/11/2019</td>
<td>Xi Jinping expresses his views on Hong Kong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/11/2019</td>
<td>Media continues to report on Xi Jinping’s views on Hong Kong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/11/2019</td>
<td>Protesters stay in the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/11/2019</td>
<td>The People’s Liberation Army clears roadblocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/11/2019</td>
<td>The police surround the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and clash violently with protesters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/11/19</td>
<td>The police continue to surround the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/11/19</td>
<td>The anti-mask law is ruled to be unconstitutional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/11/19</td>
<td>The police continue to surround the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/11/19</td>
<td>The US Senate passes the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/11/19</td>
<td>Media continues to report on the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act being passed in the US Senate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/11/19</td>
<td>The District Council Election sees record high voter turnout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/11/19</td>
<td>The pro-democracy camp wins a majority of seats (388 out of 452) in the District Councils.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/11/19</td>
<td>The Hung Hom Cross-Harbour Tunnel reopens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/11/19</td>
<td>US President Donald Trump signs the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/19</td>
<td>The police end its siege of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/19</td>
<td>Protesters march along Tsim Sha Tsui.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/12/19</td>
<td>The Civil Human Rights Front announces that around eight hundred thousand people participated in the International Human Rights Day protest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/12/19</td>
<td>Three men suspected of testing bombs in Tuen Mun are arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/12/19</td>
<td>Carrie Lam pays a duty visit to Beijing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24–27/12/19</td>
<td>Protesting activities occur in multiple districts during Christmas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/12/19</td>
<td>Protesting activities occur in multiple districts on New Year’s Eve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/2020</td>
<td>The Civil Human Rights Front organizes the New Year Rally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–18/1/2020</td>
<td>First set of news stories on the epidemics appeared on 2/1/2020; Counting all 17 days together, epidemic news occupied 4 days, movement news did not appear at all, while headlines for the remaining days were very diversified; This can be taken as the fade-out period of movement news cum fade-in period of epidemic news.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/1/2020</td>
<td>Rally at Central turns into a conflict between protestors and the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/1–27/2/2020</td>
<td>After another important movement event reported on January 19, there was another 39 days of silence; Epidemic news became headline story for 37 out of 39 days during this period, the remaining 2 days were taken up by stories on Hong Kong’s annual budget; This clearly indicates that the political movement has given way to health problems, only punctuated only by sporadic small-scale protest events which did not make to frontpage headlines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/2/2020</td>
<td>US Department of State and some councillors express concern over the arrest of Jimmy Lai, Lee Cheuk-yan and Yeung Sum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–30/3/2020</td>
<td>For the whole month of March, there was no more frontpage headline stories related to the movement, while there were stories everyday on the epidemic which was recognized as a pandemic by the World Health Organization on 11 March 2020.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PS.12 Based on this supplementary chronology, we can conclude with clear certainty that
the anti-extradition bill movement had somewhat slowed down after the success of the
pro-democratic camp at the District Council Election held on November 24, 2019, and
then ended somewhat abruptly two months later with the onset of the epidemic in late
January 2020 which concurred with the Chinese New Year and which turned into a
worldwide pandemic in March 2020.

PS.13 The government proposed to amend the Extradition Bill in mid-February 2019.
According to our supplementary chronology, mid-February 2020 was the last time we
saw a major event of the anti-extradition bill movement. We can therefore conclude
that the entire movement has occurred for exactly one whole year, from germination to
termination, or perhaps just intermission.

PS.14 As with all historical analysis, factors giving birth to a social movement do not just
appear overnight, nor would the effects of a movement disappear over another night.
As of this date, exactly one year after the CHRF organized its first protest on March
31, 2019, practically most of people’s demands pronounced in the movement and all of
the deep rooted conflicts in Hong Kong remain unsettled.

PS.15 Therefore, when the pandemic subsides, the deep rooted problems concluded in this
report, namely, the clash between liberalism versus paternalism and the debate
between patriotism versus humanism will re-emerge. The dilemmas of communism
versus capitalism, paternalism versus egalitarianism, liberty versus responsibility,
unity versus diversity, and humanism versus patriotism will have to be re-visited.
Whether they would fuel the revival of this movement, or sublimate into another form
of rational deliberation or violent confrontation, is something yet to be seen.
## Annex

### Anti-Extradition Bill Movement
Public Sentiment Report

#### Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Event of Anti-Extradition Bill Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 13, 2019</td>
<td>The Security Bureau proposed to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance (hereafter “the Extradition Bill”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 4, 2019</td>
<td>The Hong Kong Bar Association expressed its view that the proposal could have “significant and far-ranging effects” that could undermine Hong Kong’s reputation as a free and safe city protected by the rule of law. The Bar offered nine suggestions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 13, 2019</td>
<td>The Security Bureau announced that it had completed a 20-day consultation on the Bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 2019</td>
<td>The Government announced that the draft Extradition Bill would be tabled in the Legislative Council on April 3, 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 31, 2019</td>
<td>The Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) organized its first march to press for the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, and announced that 130,000 people participated, while the police estimated peak attendance at 22,800 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2, 2019</td>
<td>The Hong Kong Bar Association put forward its observations on the proposed Bill in which it criticized the Government for misleading the public when it stated that the inability to extradite suspects to the Mainland was a “loophole” in our existing law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3, 2019</td>
<td>The Bill’s first reading in the Legislative Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12, 2019</td>
<td>Madam Justice Anthea Pang Po-kam of the High Court said the court would not deal with Chan Tong-kai’s suspected murder case in Taiwan but would only deal with his money laundering case, to which Chan pleaded guilty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18, 2019</td>
<td>The Bills Committee for the Extradition Bill launched its inaugural meeting but was aborted due to the lack of a quorum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 28, 2019</td>
<td>The CHRF launched its second anti-extradition bill march.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 2019</td>
<td>Chan Tong-kai was convicted of four counts of money laundering and sentenced to imprisonment of two years and five months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 4, 2019</td>
<td>The House Committee of the Legislative Council at its special meeting passed a petitioned request for the consideration of the Bills Committee — to replace Councillor James To (Democratic Party) by Councillor Abraham Shek (Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong) as the convenor of the meeting to elect the Chair of the Bills Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 2019</td>
<td>Pro-establishment and pro-democracy councillors clashed in the meeting chamber over the Extradition Bill. The meeting chaired by Councillor Abraham Shek failed to complete the election of the Chairman of the Bills Committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chronology is compiled using the HKPOP “Opinion Daily” approach, whereby any relevant event reported by over 25% of headlines and editorials of all Hong Kong newspapers in a particular day would be included, supplemented by more searches in the electronic databases of newspaper records.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Event of Anti-Extradition Bill Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 2019</td>
<td>The Bills Committee for the Extradition Bill re-convened under Councillor Abraham Shek but again failed to elect a Chairman; and Shek then ended the meeting. The meeting convened by James To proposed a negotiation session between the Government, the pro-establishment camp and the pro-democracy camp. Chief Secretary for Administration Matthew Cheung Kin-chung rejected the proposal on the ground that, as the matter concerned the election of the chairman of the bills committee, the executive branch would not interfere with the internal affairs of the Legislative Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15, 2019</td>
<td>Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office Director Zhang Xiao Ming stated that the Extradition Bill was necessary, appropriate, reasonable and legitimate. He wanted discussions to be mindful of three salient points: “uphold justice and the rule of law, return to being practical and professional, and respect one country within one country, two systems”. The chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, Philip Dykes, and 11 of his predecessors co-signed a statement expressing “dismay” at the government’s attempt to rush the Extradition Bill through the legislature without proper consultation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17, 2019</td>
<td>The Liaison Office convened a meeting of over 200 Hong Kong deputies to the National Peoples’ Congress and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20, 2019</td>
<td>The HKSAR government decided to bypass the Bills Committee and move the Extradition Bill to the full council of the Legislative Council for its second reading on June 12, 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 24, 2019</td>
<td>The European Union Office to Hong Kong delivered a formal diplomatic “demarche” protest note to Hong Kong’s leader over the extradition bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29, 2019</td>
<td>Thirty-nine Legislative Councillors of the pro-establishment camp proposed two major amendments to the Extradition Bill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30, 2019</td>
<td>The Secretary for Security John Lee announced that the HKSAR government would include six safeguard measures, viz.: limit offences to those punishable by seven years’ imprisonment rather than three, remove seven of the proposed offences for extradition, affirm presumption of innocence, ensure that suspects would not be forced to admit to charges, ensure a fair trial, and make sure that only the central government could initiate the request for extradition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5, 2019</td>
<td>The Law Society of Hong Kong expressed its view that the government should not pass the Extradition Bill without adequate consultation. Furthermore, the Law Society told the government it must incorporate more safeguards, raise the transparency of the extradition process and increase the power of the courts to adjudicate. It also recommended a committal proceeding to allow the suspect to gather evidence to prepare a defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 2019</td>
<td>The Hong Kong Bar Association issued its additional observations on the proposed Bill. Dressed in black, Hong Kong’s legal profession staged a march to protest against the Extradition Bill. Around 3,000 lawyers took part, an unprecedented number since the handover in 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Major Event of Anti-Extradition Bill Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9, 2019</td>
<td>The CHRF organized its third anti-extradition bill march. It estimated that 1.03 million people participated, while the Hong Kong Police Force put its estimate of peak attendance at 240,000 people. Late into the night, after the HKSAR government announced that the Extradition Bill would go directly to the full council as planned, protesters remained around the Legislative Council area and the Central Government Complex. They clashed with the police who wanted to clear the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10, 2019</td>
<td>Chief Executive Carrie Lam, the Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng and the Secretary for Security John Lee Ka-chiu reiterated the case for the Extradition Bill and announced four new areas of work. These included intensive explanation to the people on the purpose and nature of the Bill, enhanced human rights protection, regular reports to the Legislative Council on the execution of the Bill, and work towards long-term extradition agreements with other jurisdictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12, 2019</td>
<td>The Legislative Council resumed the second reading of the Extradition Bill. A large crowd gathered outside the Legislative Council building. Protesters began to storm the Legislative Council Complex and the police cordoned off the Central Government Complex. The police fired many rounds of tear gas, bean bag bullets and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd. Chief Executive Carrie Lam held a televised address later that night and said “[the protest] was no longer a peaceful assembly, but an organised instigation of a riot.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 15, 2019</td>
<td>Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced that the HKSAR government had decided to suspend work on the Extradition Bill. A man dressed in a yellow raincoat to protest against the Extradition Bill, who had been standing at the scaffold next to the outer wall of the Pacific Place Mall in Admiralty for 5 hours, fell to his death in the night, marking the first casualty related to the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16, 2019</td>
<td>The CHRF organized another march, reiterating its demands for the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill and the resignation of Carrie Lam. The march lasted for more than 8 hours. The CHRF announced that two million and one people participated, while the police estimated peak attendance along the planned route at 338,000 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 18, 2019</td>
<td>Chief Executive Carrie Lam “sincerely apologized” to Hong Kong people and stated the Bill had been suspended and there was no timetable for its resumption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 21, 2019</td>
<td>The Hong Kong Bar Association proposed the complete withdrawal of the Bill and called for an independent investigation into the clashes between the police and the public on June 12. Netizens launched a call to surround important government buildings. Several thousand protesters surrounded six important government office sites which had to close early. Many main roads were blocked and traffic was disrupted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Major Event of Anti-Extradition Bill Movement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 23, 2019</td>
<td>32 former senior officials of the HKSAR Government and Legislative Councillors co-signed a statement urging the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill and the appointment of an independent commission of inquiry to look into the use of police force and related protests. Petitioners included the former Chief Secretary for Administration Mrs. Anson Chan, former Secretary for Security Peter Lai Hing-ling, former Deputy Secretary for Economic Services Elizabeth Margaret Bosher and former Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Michael Sze Cho-cheung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 2019</td>
<td>Pro-establishment Legislative Councillor Junius Ho and Politikh Social Strategic organized a rally at Tamar Park with the theme “Support Hong Kong Police, Protect the Law, Maintain Tranquillity”. The organizers announced that over 165,000 people had attended, while the police put the peak attendance at 53,000 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 2019</td>
<td>Anti-extradition bill protesters participated in the annual July 1st march to press their demands. CHRF announced that 550,000 people attended. In the afternoon, protesters stormed the LegCo Complex with iron rods and metal cages, breaking the glass doors and the walls. In the evening, protesters occupied the Legislative Council Complex for three hours. Thousands of riot police were deployed at midnight to clear the crowd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2, 2019</td>
<td>Chief Executive Carrie Lam, Chief Secretary for Administration Matthew Cheung Kin-chung, Secretary for Security John Lee Ka-chiu and Commissioner of Police Stephen Lo Wai-chung held a press conference at 4 am. They condemned the events earlier that evening and warned that violence would undermine Hong Kong’s core values and that they would call the protesters to account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6, 2019</td>
<td>The Anti-Extradition Protest Trust was formally registered and renamed as the “612 Humanitarian Relief Fund” to support protesters’ legal or medical expenses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 7, 2019</td>
<td>A march to West-Kowloon Express Rail Station took place. Organizers said 230,000 attended and police put the peak figure at 56,000. Later that night, protesters marched to Mongkok along Nathan Road. Riot police took action to disperse the crowd with resultant clashes. Some protesters sustained head injuries while many other were arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 2019</td>
<td>Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced that all work on the Extradition Bill had been “put to rest” and that “the bill is dead”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14, 2019</td>
<td>During the anti-extradition bill march in the Sha Tin district, police and protesters clashed in the vicinity of Sha Tin Town Centre. The police cordoned off the Shatin MTR station and many shopping malls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17, 2019</td>
<td>A silent march by the “silver-haired” to support the young people’s demands in the anti-extradition movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 2019</td>
<td>“Safeguard Hong Kong” organized a rally in Admiralty and claimed that 316,000 attended. Police said 103,000 attended at its peak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Major Event of Anti-Extradition Bill Movement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21, 2019</td>
<td>The CHRF organized its sixth march on Hong Kong Island. Protesters continued beyond Central and marched on to the Central Liaison Office in Western, where they gathered and pelted the national emblem with eggs and black paint. Later that night at Yuen Long MTR station, the “White-clad People Incident” took place. Over a hundred white-clad men indiscriminately assaulted passers-by and MTR passengers with sticks and bars. At least 45 people were injured, including a pregnant lady; one person was critical and 5 severely injured. The police did not respond when citizens raised the alarm and reported the assaults and beatings. When the police eventually went to Nam Pin Wai to investigate, they said the white-clad men gathered there were not armed and nobody was arrested. The police were accused of conniving with the attackers and were criticized for possible collusion with triads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22, 2019</td>
<td>The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce joined the city’s protesters in calling for a formal withdrawal of the Extradition Bill and the setting up of a commission of inquiry to investigate the causes of the ongoing tension and its escalation. The Chamber said Ministers should be held accountable and it also condemned the violent White-clad People Incident the day before in Yuen Long.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26, 2019</td>
<td>Chief Secretary for Administration Cheung Kin-chung issued an apology over the Yuen Long White-clad People Incident. However, this was met with a police backlash. The Chairman of the Hong Kong Police Inspectors’ Association Ng Wai-kei said that the police was sandwiched between the government and the opposition, and Cheung’s apology “had undermined the firm belief of a lot of colleagues”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28, 2019</td>
<td>Separate groups of Hong Kong protesters marched to Causeway Bay, Western and Wan Chai after the assembly in Chater Garden despite a police order that they should remain in Central. Some continued to march to the Central Liaison Office, where clashes took place later that night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 29, 2019</td>
<td>The Hong Kong-Macau Affairs Office of the State Council spokesperson Yang Guang emphasized that the central government of the People’s Republic of China would not tolerate violence in Hong Kong but would strongly support the HKSAR government, the police and the judiciary to deal a blow to illegal and criminal activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30, 2019</td>
<td>Riot police were deployed to disperse crowds who had gathered outside Kwai Chung police station in opposition to the government’s decision to charge 45 arrested protesters with rioting during the protest on July 28, 2019. One police officer pointed a Remington pump-action shotgun at the crowd outside the Kwai Fong MTR station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2, 2019</td>
<td>Thousands of Hong Kong’s civil servants demonstrated at Chater Garden and urged the government to address the five demands of the protesters. Organizers estimated that more than 40,000 people participated. The police said that at its peak there were about 13,000 people. It was the first-ever event organized and attended by civil servants after the 1997 handover.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Major Event of Anti-Extradition Bill Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 5, 2019</td>
<td>Protesters blocked roads and paralysed train services at early morning peak hours across the city. In the afternoon, a general strike and rallies across seven districts took place. Tunnels and roads in 14 districts were blocked. Protesters gathered around and damaged several police stations. Police fired tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd in different parts of the city. The HK Confederation of Trade Union spokesperson Carol Ng estimated that over 350,000 joined the strike, and 290,000 attended the assemblies in several parts of Hong Kong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 2019</td>
<td>The Hong Kong-Macau Affairs Office of the State Council spokesperson Yang Guang reiterated the central government’s support for the Chief Executive and the HKSAR government and emphasized the need to curb violence and restore order.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| August 7, 2019 | The legal profession organized a rally in black against the Secretary of Justice Teresa Cheng for instigating political charges against protesters. It demanded an independent commission of inquiry. Over 2,000 people from the legal sector attended the march.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

The Director of the Hong Kong-Macau Affairs Office Zhang Xiaoming said there was an urgent and overwhelming need to stop the violence and restore order. He further stated that if the situation in Hong Kong deteriorated and the HKSAR government was unable to control the situation, the central government could deploy a strong force to swiftly curb all unrests. Zhang further said that the anti-extradition bill incident had changed in nature, with developing signs of a “colour revolution”. He said that, to stabilize the situation, the key was to support the Chief Executive and the police force.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
<p>| August 11, 2019 | The anti-extradition bill protests in Sham Shui Po and Causeway Bay turned into confrontations across twelve districts. One female protester was shot in the right eye, allegedly by a bean bag bullet.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| August 12, 2019 | On August 9, 2019, netizens called for five consecutive days of rallies at the Hong Kong International Airport. The rally on August 12 was to show solidarity for the female protester who was injured in her right eye. Over 5,000 gathered at the airport and caused congestion at the departure and arrival halls. The Airport Authority cancelled all flights after 3:30pm.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| August 13, 2019 | Protesters continued to occupy the departure areas in the two terminals, and the Airport Authority suspended all boarding services.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| August 14, 2019 | The Airport Authority obtained a court injunction to prevent any protests or gathering at the Airport.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| August 16, 2019 | Cathay Pacific terminated the employment contracts of 2 pilots for their participation in the anti-extradition movement. The CEO of Cathay Pacific Rupert Hogg and the Chief Customer and Commercial Officer Paul Loo both resigned.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| August 18, 2019 | The CHRF organized an “ebb and flow” style rally at Victoria Park. The rallying call was “Stand against police brutality and police-triad collusion, respond to the five demands”. The rally lasted for more than 7 hours. The CHRF estimated that 1.7 million people had taken part while the police estimated peak attendance at 128,000.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 20, 2019</td>
<td>A knife attack took place at a “Lennon Wall” message board in Tseung Kwan O over the public display of political messages. The attacker left three wounded including a 26-year-old woman (a former reporter of the Hong Kong Economic Journal) in critical condition.</td>
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<td>August 23, 2019</td>
<td>Anti-extradition bill protesters organized a 60-kilometre-long Hong Kong Way, a human chain that followed the route of the three urban MTR lines. Some participants even climbed the Lion Rock to extend the chain.</td>
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<td>MTR secured an injunction from the High Court to prevent anti-government protesters from besieging and vandalizing stations, MTR property or train compartments. The injunction was in effect until August 30.</td>
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<td>August 24, 2019</td>
<td>The Kwun Tong march went ahead after receiving the police certificate of no objection, but MTR closed 7 stations along the Kwun Tong line just prior to the march. Marchers were provoked and began to block roads and surround police stations. Traffic in Kowloon came to a standstill. Some protesters also used a chainsaw to disassemble a smart lamp post on Sheung Yuet Road in Kowloon Bay.</td>
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<td>August 25, 2019</td>
<td>There was a march in the Tsuen Wan/Kwai Ching area. Protesters later gathered and blocked traffic near Yeung Uk Road. The Police deployed tear gas and fired a shot in the air. The police also deployed water cannons for the first time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 28, 2019</td>
<td>Representatives from 21 different professions called for government to respond to the protesters’ five demands. They set August 31 as the deadline and warned that, if the government did not respond, assemblies and strikes would be in place on 2 and 3 September, 2019. Students unions of 10 tertiary institutions called for a two-week strike starting from 2 September, while students from over a hundred secondary schools also supported the strike.</td>
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<td>August 30, 2019</td>
<td>Police arrested Joshua Wong and Agnes Chow of Demosisto, Chan Ho-tin of the Hong Kong National Party and the Legislative Councillors Cheng Chung-tai, Au Nok-hin and Jeremy Tam for alleged criminal acts in the protest movement.</td>
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<td>August 31, 2019</td>
<td>Netizens responded to the call for a “free walk” protest on Hong Kong Island.</td>
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<td>In the evening, protesters clashed with people on the train bound for Tiu Keng Leng at the platform of Prince Edward MTR station. A man dressed in blue was chasing and hitting protesters with a hammer. Over a hundred riot police stormed the platform and indiscriminately attacked passengers inside the train compartments resulting in total pandemonium at the station. The MTR closed the station and stopped service in almost all lines. Injured protesters were not taken to the hospital until more than two hours later. There were rumours that people had died inside the MTR station. The Hospital Authority and the Chief Secretary for Administration Matthew Cheung Kin-chung later claimed that there was no death amongst those sent to hospital.</td>
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<td>September 2, 2019</td>
<td>A number of anti-extradition bill protesters launched the “three suspends” general strike — stop work, stop classes, and stop the markets. Stopping classes involved two weeks of “boycotting classes but not learning” and 30,000 students from 10 tertiary institutions joined the strike. They demanded a positive response from the Chief Executive Carrie Lam by September 13.</td>
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<td>September 3, 2019</td>
<td>Two Hong Kong-Macau Affairs Office spokespersons expressed their view in a press conference in Beijing that the nature of the protest had changed and that the intention of the protesters now was to take over the government of the Hong Kong SAR. In response to Reuters releasing a tape-recording of a closed-door meeting wherein the Chief Executive told the business community she had wanted to resign, Carrie Lam repudiated the allegation and said she had never put forward her resignation and that she still had the confidence to lead Hong Kong out of the deadlock.</td>
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<td>September 4, 2019</td>
<td>Chief Executive Carrie Lam delivered a televised speech to formally announce the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill.</td>
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<td>September 6, 2019</td>
<td>For the first time since the movement started, Fitch Ratings downgraded Hong Kong’s long-term credit rating from AA+ to AA, and the outlook from stable to negative.</td>
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<td>September 8, 2019</td>
<td>A prayer meeting — “Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy” — took place at Chater Garden.</td>
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<td>September 15, 2019</td>
<td>Protesters joined the “Hong Kong Island Street Walk” Campaign after the original CHRF rally was called off. They took to the streets and marched towards Central, where they damaged MTR stations and national flags. In the evening, there were clashes in North Point and Fortress Hill where people in white-clad people used weapons to attack the protesters.</td>
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<td>September 24, 2019</td>
<td>Legislative Councillor Roy Kwong was attacked by three masked men in Tin Shui Wai.</td>
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<td>September 26, 2019</td>
<td>The government held a community dialogue session. 150 participants were randomly selected from a pool of online registrants. Each was allowed 3 minutes to ask question(s). The majority criticized the government as incompetent, as well as irresponsible, for not holding an independent commission of inquiry. They urged the Chief Executive Carrie Lam and Secretary of Justice Teresa Cheng to resign.</td>
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<td>September 28, 2019</td>
<td>The CHRF organized the “Rebel Against Authoritarianism” rally to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Occupy Movement. A large crowd gathered at Tamar Park. CHRF estimated that between 200,000 to 300,000 had attended. The police estimate put the peak attendance at 8,440.</td>
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<td>September 29, 2019</td>
<td>On the eve of the Chinese National Day, netizens called for a “60-city-wide Global Anti-Totalitarianism March” from Causeway Bay to Central. The police labelled the rally illegal shortly after its commencement and clashed with protesters. An Indonesian reporter was shot in the right eye in Wan Chai by a bean bag round allegedly fired by a police officer.</td>
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<td>October 1, 2019</td>
<td>Netizens organized a six-district gathering on the National Day. In Tsuen Wan, a police officer fired a shot from his gun and hit the left chest of a protester who was a Secondary 5 student. This was the first time the police deployed live firearms against a human target in the anti-extradition bill movement. The Police Commissioner Stephen Lo confirmed the police fired 6 live rounds in 4 different areas that day.</td>
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<td>October 3, 2019</td>
<td>A group of pro-establishment figures, including Legislative Councillors, formed a concern group urging the government to enact an anti-mask law.</td>
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<td>October 4, 2019</td>
<td>The Hong Kong government invoked the Emergency Regulations Ordinance (ERO) to implement an anti-mask law to curb protests, effective from zero hour of 5 October.</td>
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| October 5, 2019 | Rallies and assemblies took place in different parts of Hong Kong against the anti-mask law. At night, protesters blocked roads and damaged MTR stations and China-based corporations. The MTR closed all its stations. A police officer shot a teenager in the left thigh at close range in Yuen Long.  
  
  Chief Executive Carrie Lam appeared on TV and said Hong Kong’s public safety was severely endangered and that this was why the anti-mask law was necessary. |
| October 6, 2019 | Netizens initiated another march against the anti-mask law.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| October 10, 2019 | Chief Secretary for Administration Matthew Cheung Kin-chung announced 2,379 people had so far been arrested, 104 (4.4%) of whom were under the age of 16, and 750 (over 30%) were under the age of 18.                                                        |
| October 14, 2019 | “The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act Gathering” took place at Chater Garden with the consent of the police. The organizers said 130,000 people attended. Some waved the American flag and occupied the roads around Chater Garden. Many wore masks.                  |
| October 20, 2019 | As the march in Kowloon organized by CRHF was met by a notice of objection from the police, four pro-democracy figures, including vice-convener Figo Chan of CHRF, Leung Kwok-hung of the League of Social Democrats, Albert Ho of the Democratic Party and Cyd Ho of the Labour Party, led the march in their personal capacity to demand the government respond to the Five Demands and abolish the anti-mask law. Figo Chan announced over 350,000 people had attended.  
  
  The police cleared the crowd along Nathan Road. Legislative Councillor Jeremy Tam and the former president of The India Association Hong Kong Mohan Chugani were sprayed with blue water from the police’s water cannon as they stood on the pavement outside the Kowloon Mosque and Islamic Centre in Tsim Sha Tsui. The gates and the outer walls of the mosque were also sprayed blue. Chugani said he did not accept the apology offered by the assistant police commissioner Tang Ping-keung on the phone. |
| October 21, 2019 | Chief Executive Carrie Lam and the Police Commissioner Stephen Lo went to the mosque to apologize to the Chief Imam. Later in the evening, senior officers of the Police Force also apologized but did not admit any wrong-doing, saying that they had no choice but to use the water cannon to protect the mosque. |
| October 22, 2019 | Chan Tong-kai was released from jail after serving his sentence for money laundering.  
  
  The Taiwanese authority proposed to the HKSAR government that Taiwan would dispatch a special police squad to Hong Kong on October 23 to escort Chan back to Taiwan for trial. But the HKSAR government rejected the proposal on the ground that Taiwan’s request amounted to cross-border law enforcement and disregard for Hong Kong’s jurisdiction. |